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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis is to review and analyze the current Command and 
Control communications used by the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior 
Services and provide best business practices of Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Systems capable of responding to all public health emergencies, act of terrorism and mass 
casualty incidents.   
Natural and man-made disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, plane crashes, high-
rise building collapses, or major nuclear facility malfunctions, pose an ever-present 
danger challenge to public emergency services. In order to manage such disasters in a 
rapid and highly efficient and coordinated manner, the optimal provisions of information 
concerning any crisis situation is an essential pre-requisite. Local Police, Fire 
departments, Public Health Department, Civil Defense, Military and other emergency 
response organizations must react efficiently yet individually but most importantly, in a 
coordinated manner. These results in the necessity for both intra and inter organization 
coordination at several hierarchy levels. Since coordination requires current information, 
such information must be communicated within and between organizations in real-time, 
the need arises for an integrated communication and information system solely 
designated or disaster management that provides processing of relevant efficient, reliable 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In many organizations, individuals must be brought into the same room in order to 
effectively collaborate.  Also, complex responses are often managed only by voice 
communications, causing distortion of information passed from point to point and poor 
incident documentation.  Some organizations try to pass information by facsimile 
machine, but find that method too slow and troublesome.  Many metropolitan areas still 
use “un-sharable” acetate boards in operations centers to track status of the incident and 
resources as I experience during the California State wide exercise.  In short, responders 
often feel left behind by the digital information revolution.   
All Civilian Health Care activities (public or private) and Military Treatment 
Facilities (MTF's) are required to have a contingency plan and/or emergency plans.  An 
Emergency plan comprises a structured collection of actions that must be followed to 
adequately respond to an anticipated set of scenarios.   
The proposed research within this thesis evaluated Disaster Response Plans from 
Civilian and Military entities focusing on a general skeleton that will provide the New 
Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services (NJDHSS) or any other entity a 
guide/template to follow and be able to create their unique Disaster Response Plan 
(Chapter 2) to include guiding principles, and the life cycle of Incident Management 
Activities always ensuring the privacy of medical information.    In addition as part of an 
Emergency Response System, I researched available technologies (Chapter 8) that will 
have most or all tools that are needed to respond to a disaster. 
It is my conclusion that the Disaster Management Information System (DMIS) is 
the system of choice.  DMIS solution has an interoperability platform and a set of basic 
tools.  The interoperability backbone is one of the most important aspects of DMIS.  It is 
the backbone that allows responders to acquire software that best suits their needs 
without having to worry about their neighbors buying the same software.  The backbone 
enables information sharing among all systems that develop an automated program 
 xxii
interface to it.  In addition the basic tools provide responders with the basic ability to 





A.  SITUATION ANALYSIS 
Natural and man-made disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, plane crashes, high-
rise building collapses, or major nuclear facility malfunctions, pose an ever-present 
danger challenge to public emergency services. In order to manage such disasters in a 
rapid and highly efficient and coordinated manner, the optimal provisions of information 
concerning any crisis situation is an essential pre-requisite. Local Police, Fire 
departments, Public Health Department, Civil Defense, Military and other emergency 
response organizations must react efficiently yet individually but most importantly, in a 
coordinated manner. These results in the necessity for both intra and inter organization 
coordination at several hierarchy levels. Since coordination requires current information, 
such information must be communicated within and between organizations in real-time, 
the need arises for an integrated communication and information system solely 
designated or disaster management that provides processing of relevant efficient, reliable 
and secure exchange of information. 
Upon return from the planning meeting in March 2006, the New Jersey – NPS 
team took the responsibility of finalizing the Analysis of system and networking 
relationships for NJ Medical Response Command and Control architecture among other 




Figure 1.   NJDHSS System Diagram (From: NPS Team Progress Report) 
 
 We reviewed the topology of information flows between major entities (people, 
organizations, and systems). Our perspective centered on Hippocrates as a central link or 
“dashboard” over all other systems. We then connected all other nodes to Hippocrates, 
and then branched out to origins of those systems’ data. 
 The symbol convention used in this diagram distinguishes between systems 
(represented as clouds) and organizations (represented as circles). A line connects each 
pair of communicating entities, with the arrows showing the direction of information 
flow. Solid lines refer to existing system links, dashed lines refer to future planned links. 
 Hippocrates acts as the central hub for all information flows, pulling from and 
sometimes pushing to other systems within the state, and displaying that information to 
users as an overview of the total situational state.  The network diagram below shows the 




Figure 2.   NJDHSS Network Diagram (From: NPS Team Progress Report) 
 
 
 The information flow diagram we developed to cover signaling in a potential 
influenza outbreak is also attached.  All information flows begin when a sick person 
seeks treatment.  This treatment is recorded in CDRS either by the school nurse (if a 
school student) or by the treating hospital or treatment facility.  This is a weekly input for 
the school nurses, but event-driven input by the hospitals. Laboratory reports also are 
submitted to CDRS. Weekly, the hospitals fax aggregate data to NJLINCS. When 
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Figure 3.    Information Flow Diagram (From: NPS Team Progress Report) 
 
 In the case that a hospital administrator or other responsible party believes an 
outbreak is occurring, many other information flows are triggered.  Emails go to the 
County ED systems, EMS is alerted, JemStat receives the information, the Infection 
 Control Practitioner is alerted by the hospital, the State DOH&SS (Acute Care) is 
informed, and potentially NJLINCS informs the State DOH&SS (Communicable 
Diseases).  If appropriate, at this point, the State DOH&SS stands up the ECC, as may 
County LINCS agencies.  If the problem is worthy, the State may choose to establish 
State, County and Local EOCs to deal with the situation, in which case the DOH&SS 
sends representatives to the State EOC.  (From: NPS Progress Report) 
Unfortunately there are number of unanswered questions in the above diagrams 
and most of all the roles and responsibilities of each entity, method of information 
transfer is unknown, what rules are used to determine if an event triggers notification to 
higher authority, what do the information sinks do with the information they receive.  
Due to the numerous questions and the project being put on hold I am including examples 
that are currently used by the California’s Health and Human Services Response Plan that 
can be used by the NJDHSS.  Appendix A is a basic plan that should help to assist the 
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NJDHSS and its cities and towns in their preparedness activities to respond to an 
infectious disease emergency, such as an influenza pandemic or bioterrorism agent 
release, in order to minimize morbidity and mortality, and maintain health care and other 
essential community services during periods of high absenteeism due to illness.   
Appendix B is a guide for a Bioterrorism Surveillance and Epidemiologic Response Plan 
that is the product of collaborative efforts involving public health partners at the local, 
state, and federal levels.  Appendix C is a list of the Center of Disease and Control (CDC) 
for Top Priority Bioterrorism Threat Agents. 
The New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services requested NPS to 
provide best business practices of Emergency Preparedness and Response Systems 
capable of responding to all public health emergencies, act of terrorism and mass casualty 
incidents as described in the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement below.   
 
B.  BACKGROUND 
The New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Under authority of the U.S. 
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-502, 20 October 1986, as 
amended), and the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have entered into a Cooperative 
Research and Development Agreement (CRADA).   
The U.S. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, as amended, provides for 
developing the expertise, capabilities, and technologies of U.S. Federal laboratories 
accessible to other Federal agencies; units of State or local governments, industrial 
organizations (including corporations, partnerships and limited partnerships, and 
industrial development organizations); public and private foundations; nonprofit 
organizations (including universities); or other persons in order to improve the economic, 
environmental, and social well-being of the United States by stimulating utilization of 
U.S. Federally funded technology developments and/or capabilities.   NPS has extensive 
expertise, capabilities, and information in command and control infrastructures and, in 
accordance with the U.S. Federal Technology Transfer Act, desires to make this expertise 
and technology available for use in both the public and private sectors.  
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DHSS and NPS wish to explore the requirements for designing and implementing 
a command and control infrastructure for New Jersey’s health emergency preparedness 
and response network. DHSS has the statutory authority under N.J.S.A 26:1A-15 to 
design and prototype health command centers (HCC), design and evaluate networking 
solutions for the DHSS medical rapid response team’s communication with the command 
and control infrastructure of the State’s Medical Coordination centers (MCC) and to 
explore the integration solutions for command center communication with legacy data 
bases at emergency preparedness and response, emergency medical services, special 
operations group sites, disaster medical assistance sites, and mass casualty response. 
DHSS finds it in the public interest to provide strategic and operational leadership and 
direction, coordination, provision of services, and assessment of activities to ensure state 
and local readiness, interagency/ multidisciplinary collaboration, preparedness for 
terrorism and other outbreaks of infectious disease, natural disasters, and other public 
health threats and emergencies (From CRADA documentation). 
Complex and emerging 21st century hazardous threats demand a unified 
coordinated national approach to domestic incident management. The National Strategy 
for Homeland Security (Homeland Security Act of 2002) and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) Management of Domestic Incidents, establish clear 
objectives for a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other 
emergencies; minimize damage, and recover from attacks, major disasters, or other 
emergencies that occur.  Achieving these objectives is challenging, requiring bold steps 
and adjustments to established structures, processes, and protocols.  
An important initiative is the development and implementation of a National 
Response Plan (NRP), predicated on a new National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), that aligns the patchwork of Federal special-purpose incident management and 
emergency response plans into an effective and efficient structure. Together, the NRP and 
the NIMS (published March 1, 2004) integrate capabilities and resources of various 
governmental jurisdictions, incident management and emergency response disciplines, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector into one cohesive, 
coordinated, and seamless national framework for domestic incident management.   
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Consistent with the model provided in the NIMS, NRP can be partially or fully 
implemented in the context of a threat, anticipation of a significant event, or the response 
to a significant event. Selective implementation through the activation of one or more of 
the system’s components allows maximum flexibility in meeting the unique operational 
and information-sharing requirements of the situation at hand and enabling effective 
interaction between various Federal and non-Federal entities.  The NRP, employing 
NIMS, is an all-hazards plan that provides the structure and mechanisms for national 
level policy and operational coordination for domestic incident management.  
 
C. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is research best business practice for Disaster 
Response Plan and available technologies that are “sharable” with other organizations.  
For the Disaster Response Plan we will take a Top-Down approach starting with NMIS 
Plan to the Regional level which the New Jersey DHSS position is located. 
 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter I is the situational analysis, background and organization of the thesis.  
 The New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services requested NPS to 
 provide best business practices of Emergency Preparedness and Response 
 Systems capable of responding to all public health emergencies, act of terrorism 
 and mass casualty incidents as described in the Cooperative Research and 
 Development Agreement 
Chapter II is an introduction to the Incident Command System (ICS).   
 Incident Command System (ICS) is an organizational tool that can be thought of 
 as both a requirement of public health and disaster response agencies and as an 
 internal requirement for good emergency response management 
 Chapter III  is the Organization of the New Jersey DHSS proposed plan.   
The plan is a general guideline that provides the region with a comprehensive 
 approach to managing all domestic contingencies. When fully developed, the 
 NJDHSSP should not be an umbrella for existing Regional incident management 
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 plans; rather, it should build upon or incorporate what is best in the current plans 
 of Regional, State, and local agencies, as well as those of private voluntary 
 organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.  
Chapter IV explains the several steps an Organization must follow to create a 
 Disaster Response Plan; it includes functional areas, guidelines for a 
 comprehensive plan and the plan elements. 
Chapter V is the Assumptions and Consideration for a Disaster Response Plan.  . 
 In keeping with the requirements of HSPD-5, NJDHSS should prepare a single 
 plan that is flexible enough to accommodate ‘all hazards,’ covering all of the 
 disciplines required for conducting activities throughout the ‘Life Cycle’ of an 
 incident. Under the NJDHSS, ‘hazards’ plan should refer to the full range of 
 possible contingencies. 
Chapter VI  is the Life Cycle of Incident Management Activities and information 
 security.  The life cycle of activities is best described as containing five domains 
 within which domestic incident management activities occur: awareness, 
 prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery 
Chapter VII  in this chapter we move away from the Disaster Response plan to 
 information systems and the Available Technologies.  Throughout my research I 
 identified various suitable technologies but only one technology ‘stood out above 
 the crowd’; is the Disaster Management Interoperability Services (DMIS). DMIS 
 is not only compatible with other systems but it was also one of the systems 
 identified by the U.S. government as ‘the system of choice.’   
Chapter VIII part of the thesis, I research and found what Navy Medicine’s tool 
 of choice is: Medical Capabilities assessment and status tool (M-CAST) and how 
 this system complements the FEMA systems.  M-Cast applies specific and 
 defined capabilities against requirements of program standards providing a 
 standard measure of readiness for a given capability.  Capabilities as viewed in 
 this system represent smallest unit teams or squads performing specific functions 
 required for a hazard type.  While being applied to specific emergency 
 management capabilities, the program standards have broader applicability to 
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 capabilities in general.  Specifically, capabilities for response to chemical, 
 biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) incidents 
 should be measured against program standards and their objectives for an “all 
 hazards” approach to emergency management. 
Chapter IX  is the conclusion.  Reliability of communications by either military 
 or civilian personnel is a must.  The ability to share information between military 
 and civilian entities is very important with that in mind it is my conclusion that 
 the NJDHSS should adopt the Disaster Management Interoperability Services 
 (DMIS).  DMIS is an integral part of the President’s Disaster Management e-
 Government Initiative focused at significantly enhancing Disaster Management 
 on an interagency and intergovernmental basis.   
DMIS is built “from the bottom up” in recognition of the fact that all disasters – 
no matter how consequential or large-scaled – are first encountered by local responders.  
DMIS tools provide the ability to describe an incident and make specific needs requests 
in enough detail for shared situation awareness with other organizations that may be 
































II.  INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM 
Incident Command System (ICS) is an organizational tool that can be thought of 
as both a requirement of public health and disaster response agencies and as an internal 
requirement for good emergency response management. Disaster events may involve 
exuberant numbers of personnel, whose activities must be carefully coordinated, and 
multiple agencies that must quickly establish effective ways of interfacing with each 
other and, in a unified fashion, with the public. 
ICS is an organizational tool, employed by emergency response agencies to 
maximize the effectiveness of their response. Law enforcement, fire departments, and 
DOD have long used this system. Public health agencies have realized the necessity of 
identifying how to fit into the larger ICS and how to apply it internally to make their 
emergency response more effective. To be prepared for emergency mobilization, the 
MCC must establish its own internal incident command structure and activation 
procedures. This framework must be established prior to any event and frequently tested 
and evaluated. 
ICS provides the following key management functions: 
• Minimizes the span of control. 
• Maintains unity of command. 
• Keep decisions and resource allocations prioritized and objective-driven. 
• Uses common terminology. 
• Creates and follows an action plan. 
ICS begins with establishing lines of authority and communication to be followed 
when an event occurs (see Figure 1, below). Roles and responsibilities are pre-assigned 
and are based on job title. The Command staff consists of the Incident Commander and 




Figure 4.   ICS Organizational Flow Chart  (From: NRP) 
 
The Incident Commander has the ultimate responsibility for determining event 
objectives and strategies. The Information Officer coordinates all information 
dissemination and clears all information releases. If an information point person is not 
made readily available to the media or is not prepared to provide accurate information 
that addresses the public’s concerns, the media should conduct its own risk interpretation 
and should disseminate its own conclusions to the public. In the case of a possible 
bioterrorist event, information control can be a more sensitive issue if, for example, a 
criminal investigation is concurrent with the event management. In the case of an event 
involving human patients, there are additional concerns for privacy of victims and 
sensitivity to victims’ families.  The Safety Officer anticipates, detects, and corrects 
unsafe situations. The Liaison Officer serves as a contact point for representatives of 
assisting and cooperating agencies. The Operations Section develops the strategy portion 
of the Incident Action Plan, participates in the planning process, and accomplishes the 
incident objectives. The Planning Section maintains resource status, gathers and analyzes 
data, provides displays of situations, estimates future probabilities, and prepares 
alternative strategies. The Logistics section manages the allocation of personnel, 
equipment, services, and support. This section is responsible for management of internal 
communications equipment and strategies. The section also is responsible for 
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procurement and for servicing equipment. The Finance and Administration Section 
should provide financial management and accountability. They should authorize 
expenditures, maintain disaster records, maintain injury and damage documentation 
negotiate vendor contracts, and establish any formal agreements with other agencies.  ICS 
is flexible, allowing for a systematic approach that can be expanded or collapsed as 
needed, depending on the level of response required for a specific incident. ICS allows 
for multiple emergency response agencies to effectively coordinate to maximize resource 
utilization and improve communication while minimizing confusion, proliferation of 
misinformation, and duplication of efforts. 
The next chapter gives us a bird’s eye view of the general organization of a 
Disaster Response Plan.  As we have seen thus far, all Civilian Health Care activities 
(public or private) and Military Treatment Facilities (MTF's) are required to have a 
contingency plan and/or emergency plans.  An Emergency plan comprises a structured 
collection of actions that must be followed to adequately respond to an anticipated set of 
scenarios.  The emergency plan shall describe the resources required, including human 
and material resources, ancillary documentation, such as maps, simulation results, lists of 
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III.  ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVICES PLAN (NJDHSSP)  
The NJDHSSP should be a base plan that provides the region with a 
comprehensive approach to managing all domestic contingencies. When fully developed, 
the NJDHSSP should not be an umbrella for existing Regional incident management 
plans; rather, it should build upon or incorporate what is best in the current plans of 
Regional, State, and local agencies, as well as those of private voluntary organizations, 

















Figure 5.   NJDHSS Proposed Flowchart 
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The primary elements of the NJDHSSP as envisioned in this initial Plan are as 
follows:  
 
A.  THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
This section should describe the activities of local, State, and Regional authorities 
and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) and the private sector in managing 
domestic contingencies. A key element in the NJDHSSP is the distinction between the 
ongoing responsibilities of the Head and the responsibilities of the Incident Commander 
(IC) and Supporting Agencies (SAs) in the context of a given contingency.  
In keeping with the National Strategy for Homeland Security and HSPD-5, the 
NJDHSS should recognize the American governmental structure with its Federal, State, 
and local authorities, as well as the vital roles that the private sector and the citizenry play 
in contributing to a robust national effort in all domains and under all contingencies. 
These efforts are further supported by interconnected and complementary resource 
coordination mechanisms and operational capabilities from all relevant entities to help 
ensure that essential requirements for each contingency are met.  
 
B. STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES  
State and local levels of government
 
have the primary responsibility for funding, 
preparing, and operating services that initially respond to an incident. For example, State 
and local law enforcement and health personnel provide the first line of defense in 
protecting critical infrastructures and public health and safety. Local police, fire, 
emergency medical, emergency management, public health, and other personnel are often 
the first to respond to an incident and the last to leave. In some instances, a Federal 
agency in the local area may act as a first responder to an incident, and local assets of 
Federal agencies may be employed to advise or assist State or local authorities with the 
approval of the local head of the Federal agency.  
As a State’s chief executive, the Governor is responsible for the public safety and 
welfare of the people of that State or territory. The Governor:  
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1.  Is responsible for coordinating State and local resources to address 
effectively the full spectrum of actions to prepare for and to respond to 
man-made incidents,  including terrorism, natural disasters, and other 
contingencies;  
2.  Has extraordinary powers during a contingency to suspend authority, to 
seize property, to direct evacuations, and to authorize emergency funds;  
3.  Plays a key role in communicating to the public, in requesting Federal 
assistance, when State capabilities have been exceeded or exhausted, and 
in helping people, businesses, and organizations to cope with disasters; 
and  
4.  May also encourage local mutual aid and implement authorities for the 
State to enter into mutual aid agreements with other States and territories 
to facilitate resource sharing.  
 
Figure 6.   Emergency Organization Structure (After: NRP) 
 
 18
C. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT  
HSPD-5 assigns specific roles and responsibilities to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, other key Federal executives, and departments and agencies involved in 
domestic incident management. These roles and responsibilities should be exercised in 
conjunction with existing agency authorities and missions.  
1. Secretary of Homeland Security  
Under the authority of HSPD-5, the roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of 
Homeland Security fall in four broad areas. These are: Direction and Planning, 
Communications and Information, Training and Continuous Improvement, and Incident 
Management. As defined in Section 2 (10) and (14) of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, et seq. (2002).  
a. Direction and Planning  
The Secretary:  
(1) Directs the efforts of various Federal departments and agencies in 
anticipating, preventing, preparing for, responding to, or recovering from terrorist 
incidents, natural disasters, or other emergencies and for special events.  
(2) Under relationships and mechanisms established for such purposes, 
directs the integration of DHS activities and various other Federal departments and 
agencies with those of the Attorney General, generally through the FBI, concerning 
domestic intelligence collection, law enforcement activities to detect, prevent, preempt, 
and disrupt terrorist attacks, and criminal investigations of terrorist threats or attacks.  
(3) Under relationships and mechanisms established for such purposes, 
directs the integration of DHS activities and various other Federal departments and 
agencies with those of the Secretary of State when international activities are required to 
assist in awareness, prevention, preparation, response, or recovery activities related to a 
domestic incident.  
(4) Under relationships and mechanisms established for such purposes, 
directs the integration of DHS activities and various other Federal departments and 
agencies those of the Secretary of Defense concerning military support to civil authorities 
and for Homeland Defense activities.  
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(5) Provides direction and assistance to State and local governments to 
develop all disciplines, all hazards plans and to ensure that these plans are compatible 
with the NRP and to ensure that adequate equipment and other capabilities are in place, 
that personnel are trained, and that the plans are exercised.  
(6) Provides direction and assistance to the private sector to ensure that 
adequate planning, training, and exercise activities take place and to promote 
collaboration to develop sufficient capability to reduce the nation’s vulnerability.  
b. Communications and Information  
The Secretary:  
(1) Provides a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and 
technologies describing the National Incident Management System.  
(2) Oversees and, as appropriate, consolidates the Federal government's 
communications and systems of communications relating to homeland security with State 
and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, the private sector, other 
entities, and the public.  
(3) Ensures that, as appropriate, information related to domestic incidents 
is gathered and provided to the President; to the public, private sector, state and local 
authorities; and all Federal departments and agencies.  
c. Training and Continuous Improvement  
The Secretary:  
(1) Provides standardized, qualitative reports to the Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security on the readiness and preparedness of the nation to 
anticipate, prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents.  
(2) Ensures rigorous requirements for continuous improvements through a 
national system to plan, equip, train, exercise, test, and evaluate and to provide standards 
and credentialing for homeland security.  
(3) Directs and supervises specific grant programs of the Federal 
government for State and local governments and the private sector.  
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(4) Develops a comprehensive program for research and development 
(R&D) conducts basic, applied and advanced homeland security R&D; and facilitates the 
development of technical standards for homeland security.  
d. Incident Management  
The Secretary:  
(1) Is the Principal Federal Official for domestic incident management.  
(2) Provides direction for Federal operations for incident management 
within the United States to prepare for, respond to, or recover from terrorist attacks, 
major disasters, and other emergencies; and  
(3) Provides direction for the application of the Federal Government’s 
resources utilized in response to or recovery from domestic incidents if and when any of 
the following conditions or thresholds apply:  
a. A Federal department or agency acting under its own authority requests 
the Secretary’s assistance.   
b. The resources of State and local authorities have been overwhelmed and 
Federal assistance has been requested.  
c. More than one Federal department or agency has become substantially 
involved in responding to an incident, or  
d. The President directs the Secretary to assume responsibility for 
managing the domestic incident.  
  The below tables are a summary of the Secretary’s responsibilities during 












Table 1.   Secretary’s Role during Natural Disasters (From: NRP) 
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Table 2.   Secretary’s Role during Terrorist or Criminal Incidents (From: NRP) 
 
D. REGIONAL AND NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMANDS 
 In situations where there is a need for senior executive-level response 
coordination, command and control of an incident may include the use of a Regional or 
National Incident Command (RIC/NIC).  The purpose of a RIC/NIC organization is to 
oversee the overall management of the incident(s), focusing primarily on strategic 
assistance and direction and resolving competition for scarce response resources.  This 
organization does not supplant the IC(s), but supports and provides strategic direction. 
Execution of tactical operations and coordination remains the responsibility of the 
IC(s)/UC(s). 
 Regional Incident Command - A RIC is an organization activated by the District 
Commander to ensure coordination for Command, Planning, and Logistical matters.  The 
need for a RIC may arise when there are multiple on-scene ICs, multiple organization ICs 
and/or when there is heavy demand for Military resources from other agencies such as the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  The RIC will determine which 
critical resources are sent to which incident and determine priorities for their assignment.  
It is the desire of the NJDHSS to act as the RIC organization.   
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 National Incident Command - A NIC is an organization that is functionally 
similar to the RlC and is used if the incident requires the direct involvement of the most 
senior Military Operational Commander(s). 
 
E. PRIVATE SECTOR  
1. Nongovernmental organizations, including voluntary organizations, provide 
essential services to victims regardless of their eligibility for Federal or State assistance. 
Volunteers enhance community coordination and action at both the national and local 
levels.  
2. As the principal provider of goods and services and the owner of approximately 
85 percent of the national infrastructure, private business and industry play a significant 
role in helping to mitigate the physical effects and economic costs of domestic incidents. 
Business and industry collaboration with governments and other organizations are 
essential for protecting and restoring the nation’s critical infrastructure in the event of an 
incident.  
a. To enhance their preparedness before an incident, businesses are urged 
to identify their risks, develop appropriate contingency plans, and take corrective actions 
to enhance their overall readiness.  
b. Businesses and industry can supply critical resources, can assist in 
restoring essential services in the short term, and can help rebuild the economic base as 
part of the recovery effort.  
 
F. CITIZENRY  
 As residents in their communities, citizens are active in preparing for and 
responding to a variety of emergencies and events. Strong partnerships with citizens and 
their communities are another vital support element of the national framework involving 
awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. 
 As we move along from a Top-down view the next chapter will provide specific 
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IV. ORGANIZATION OF A DISASTER PLAN  
This chapter will describe the principal aspects of the Domestic Incident 
Management System (DIMS) and makes initial assignments to Regional agencies 
regarding their responsibilities with respect to each of the functional areas and domains 
that describe the life cycle of an incident. Additionally, this section describes how 
domestic incidents should be managed, using procedures outlined in this Plan, in concert 
with the procedures and coordinating structures contained in existing Regional plans, 
until full implementation of the approved NJDHSSP.  
The NJDHSSP should be a living document that should constantly be revised in 
response to new information, new situations, new technology, lessons learned and refined 
procedures.  
 
A.  FUNCTIONAL AREA PLANS  
This section should be developed for each functional area by the Program 
Manager, in coordination with all of the Department Heads involved in the functional 
area. These plans should describe the tasks that should be performed within the functional 
area, identify potential assignments for each section, and define the coordination 
mechanisms by which functional area assessments should be conducted, and by which 
support to awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities should 
be coordinated. 
  
B. DEVELOPING A DISASTER PLAN 
 Before an organization can begin to develop a disaster plan, there must be full 
commitment from all management levels and this process must be assigned a high level 
of priority. It is important that key program staff be involved at various levels of plan 
development and implementation for the plan to be successful. It must also be understood 




completed and filed on a shelf. To have an effective response to an emergency, NJDHSS 
plan must be carefully developed, appropriate to their needs, routinely reviewed and 
updated, and practiced.   
1. Objectives 
¾ Establish disaster planning as a high priority. 
¾ Obtain full support, conceptually and financially, for plan development and 
maintenance. 
¾ Develop a comprehensive disaster response plan. 
2. Before the Incident 
¾ Select/ldentify an individual or group of individuals to develop the plan. The 
size of the team will depend on the level of the program's responsibilities, 
operations, and resources. 
¾ Obtain approval of upper management to authorize the time needed for the 
planning process. 
¾ Empower the team, in writing, with the authority and responsibility of plan 
development and maintenance. 
¾ Issue a “Mission Statement” to define the purpose of the plan and the 
authority and structure of the planning group; include financial support. 
¾ Establish a work schedule and planning deadlines for the planning team. 
¾ Identify internal resources and capabilities. 
¾ Gather information about your current responsibilities, capabilities, and 
response expectations. 
¾ Identify the laws and regulations that provide the specific authority for the 
program to conduct its activities. Be sure to consider the New Jersey Heath 
and Safety Code, New Jersey Code of Regulations, and other statutes and 
regulations applicable to the program. 
¾ Identify critical operations that will be given priority in an emergency. 
¾ Develop Emergency Operations Center (EOC) organization structure and 
staffing list. 
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¾ Identify the reporting relationships and chain of command required to contact 
the  NJDHS Emergency Operations Center (CDHS EOC), and applicable 
emergency operations centers at the local level. 
¾ Develop a relationship with the individual(s) who represent your activities at 
the (NJDHS EOC) during a disaster. 
¾ Ensure that the plan includes a response to incidents that do not rise to the 
level of “declared disasters” but may require increased public and 
environmental health response such as hazardous material incidents, food 
borne illness outbreaks, etc. 
¾ Contact the local emergency planning office for communities with program 
field offices to determine the typical emergencies to which program staff may 
need to respond, i.e., earthquakes, fires, floods, and hazardous materials 
releases.  Review and identify your program facilities that can be impacted by 
those events. 
¾ Identify how program staff will respond to the event to protect public health. 
¾ Determine if there are other vulnerable program facilities or areas that could 
be impacted and ensure that the emergency plan includes these hazards. 
¾ Establish guidelines that identify various levels of plan activation and 
appropriate personnel to respond. 
¾ Determine specific goals for the plan development team and set achievable 
objectives and timelines. 
¾ Make a list of tasks to be performed and assign responsibilities within the 
team. 
C. PLAN ELEMENTS 
Include the following elements in the plan: 
 Introduction 
¾ Provides a brief overview of the purpose for the plan  
 Authorities and References 




 Emergency Management Organization 
¾ Describes the emergency management structure in place for the program and 
how the program fits into the local, regional, or state response structure. 
¾ Identifies who is in charge 
¾ Describes the continuity of management for the program 
¾ Establishes compliance with the Standardized Emergency Management 
System 
 (SEMS) 
¾ Provides a description of the Incident Command System and how it relates to 
the field response activities. 
 Concept of Operations 
¾ Describes the emergency response procedures (plan activation, call down etc.) 
that will be implemented. 
¾ Describes the role of each unit within your program. 
¾ Identifies how priorities will be set. 
¾ If applicable describes structure and organization of EOC. 
¾ Describes how mutual aid or supplemental resources will be requested or 
provided and how outside resources will be integrated into the program's 
response. 
¾ Description of field response and relationships to JEOC. 
¾ Relationships with federal agencies. 
 Supporting Documents and Appendices 
¾ Includes supporting documents such as detailed procedures, checklists, phone 
rosters, resource lists, lists of useful acronyms, a glossary of terms, etc. Also 
includes copies of forms necessary for financial record keeping and reporting 
response status. 
 Incorporate the plan into the program’s operations including: 
¾ Conduct orientation sessions for staff 
¾ Ensure that all staff understands their role in an emergency. 
¾ Conduct emergency exercises both internally and in coordination with other 
agencies. 
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¾ At least annually, evaluate and modify the plan as necessary. 
 
D. DURING THE INCIDENT 
¾ Activate the phases of the plan as appropriate. 
¾ Review the elements of the plan and make changes as needed. 
 
E. AFTER THE INCIDENT 
¾ Conduct an in-depth review and critique of response activities and the emergency 
plan with staff and with other organizations or agencies with which they 
interacted. Review all activities associated with the incident and make 
recommendations for change. 
¾ Create a detailed after-action report on all activities of the program during the 
incident. 
¾ Make adjustments to the plan based on the lessons learned during the response. 
















Figure 7.   NJDHSS Organizational Chart (From: NJDHSS) 
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 The DHSS has created the Medical Coordination Center (MCC) Program within 
the Division of Health Emergency Preparedness and Response.  The MCC Program is 
developed and supervised by the Division of Health Emergency Preparedness and 
Response, MCC/DHSS Coordinator.  The MCC Program will be enhanced and staffed by 
additional MCC regional personnel.  The DHSS has created five (5) health planning 
regions based a statewide threat assessment and a variety of hazard vulnerability factors 
to include:  population, population density, location of health care facilities, as well as 
identified high risk hazards. 
The MCC Program is designed to enhance statewide coordination capability and 
to maintain the integrity of New Jersey’s public health care system(s) in order to 
minimize the effects of public health, health care or mass casualty incidents (MCI). 
Now that we have discussed the roles and responsibilities and how the plan 
should be structured, the next step is to look at specific elements that are needed to 
develop a comprehensive Disaster Response plan such as the assumptions, considerations 















V. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
A. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS  
1.  A Single Plan  
The New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services (NJDHSS) should 
integrate existing State domestic awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and 
recovery plans in to one base plan, addressing functional areas common to most 
contingencies, including annexes that describe unique procedures required under special 
circumstances.  
2.  An “All Hazards/All Disciplines” Plan  
Current emergency plans are designed to deal with particular types of 
contingencies. In keeping with the requirements of HSPD-5, I would advocate that  
NJDHSS prepares a single plan that is flexible enough to accommodate ‘all hazards,’ 
covering all of the disciplines required for conducting activities throughout the ‘Life 
Cycle’ of an incident. Under the NJDHSS, ‘hazards’ plan should refer to the full range of 
possible contingencies, including:  
a. Natural Disasters 
Such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, droughts, and 
epidemics;  
b. Accidents  
Such as chemical spills, industrial accidents, radiological or nuclear 
incidents, explosions, and utility outages;  
c. Civil or Political  
Incidents including mass migrations, the domestic effects of war, nation-
state attacks, and unrest or disorder resulting from riots, public demonstrations, and 
strikes.  
d. Terrorist or Criminal  
Incidents including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, 




e. Significant Events and Designated Special Events  
Requiring security, such as inaugurals, State of the Union  addresses, the 
Olympics, and international summit conferences.  These contingencies are not mutually 
exclusive and may occur individually, simultaneously, or in combination.  
3.  A Plan that Emphasizes Unity of Effort among All Levels of the 
Region  
The NJDHSS plan should emphasize unity of effort among all levels of the 
Region. Under this Plan, Federal, State, and local governments, including private 
organizations and the American public, should work as partners to manage domestic 
contingencies efficiently and effectively.  There is pressure from Federal, State and local 
agencies as well as industry associations, including the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) for a 
better regional response planning.  In addition JCAHO has made emergency preparedness 
one of its seven public policy initiatives and has increased its accreditation requirements 
in that area.  Healthcare providers have begun to take into account the need for more 
regional planning since disasters can cross city and state boundaries.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Incident Command Post (From: NRP) 
 33
4.  A Plan that Integrates Crisis and Consequence Management  
In keeping with the Presidential Directive, the NJDHSS should “treat crisis 
management and consequence management as a single, integrated function, rather than as 
two separate functions.”  
5.  A Plan that Places the Same Emphasis on Awareness, Prevention, and 
Preparedness, Traditionally Has Been Placed on Response and 
Recovery  
Traditionally, response plans have been exactly what their name implies—plans 
for responding to and recovering from an incident or contingency. In the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001, however, preventing terrorism and reducing our nation’s 
vulnerabilities through preparedness have become top priorities. The NRP (National 
Response Plan) set forth a new concept of a ‘response’ plan by covering five domains: 
Awareness, Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery which NJDHSS should 
follow. 
 
B.  GUIDING PRINCIPLES  
In addition to the imperatives set forth in HSPD-5, the following fundamental 
principles guide the development of the NJDHSS:  
1.  Fundamental Role of State and Local Authorities  
The NRP recognizes that domestic contingencies generally begin and are initially 
responded to as local events. The vast majority of events are dealt with at the State or 
local level. Federal involvement should not be necessary in many instances, except for 
reporting.  
2.  Importance of Effective Communication  
Information sharing between agencies is critical for the ultimate success of a 
regional plan. The NJDHSS requires effective information sharing among all affected 
parties. Timely reporting is vital for informed decision making at all levels.  
3.  Primacy of Preserving Human Life  
Preserving human life constitutes the first priority under the NJDHSS, during the 
execution of activities under this Plan. Preserving human life should always take 
precedence over all other responses and recovery requirements.  
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4.  Seamless Transitions  
The NJDHSS plan should include mechanisms to provide seamless transitions 
that must occur on several levels. To be effective, operations must transition smoothly 
from simple to complex situations and from routine, day-to-day operations to catastrophic 
incidents. 
5.  Standardization of Systems, Procedures, and Communications  
Effective incident-management operations require interoperability and 
compatibility in systems, procedures, and communications. Through the Medical 
Coordination Center System (MCCS), this Plan should provide a core set of concepts, 
principles, terminologies, and technologies. Agencies and authorities are expected to 
conform to the standards of the NJDHSS and the MCC.  
6.  Integration of Best Practices  
To capitalize on what has been deemed effective in the past, the NJDHSSP should 
incorporate best practices from previous plans and agencies, as well as exercises and 
actual experience. Additionally; the NJDHSSP and the MCC should contain required 
processes to ensure continuous improvement and vulnerability reduction through lessons 
learned and other feedback. The MCCS should also include processes for taking 
advantage of research and development and technological advances.  
7.  Need for an Agile Incident Management Capability  
To support this requirement, the NJDHSSP must be:  
a. Scalable  
The NJDHSSP can be utilized to cover the spectrum from day-to-day 
incident management activities to the most complex and severe contingencies, including 
catastrophic events.  
b. Modular  
The NJDHSSP should be designed so that some or all of its components 
can be tailored to  fit the specific requirements of a situation.  
c. Flexible  
The NJDHSSP should be able to address new threats and risks. It should 
also address the need to implement changes to operational procedures based on lessons 
learned such as the TOPOFF 3 exercise and other feedback mechanisms.  
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8.  Ability to Accommodate State and Local Systems  
When implemented, the NJDHSSP and the MCCS should be flexible enough to 
accommodate State and local incident management systems.  
The below figure represents how the different plans relate to each other: 
 
Figure 9.   Relationship of Plans (From: NIMS) 
 
 There is a great quote “People are the most forgotten part of the organization” by 
Dr. Ambuj Goya, General Manager of Lotus Software.  According to Ambuj, the 
untapped resources in organization are human responsiveness, awareness, and ingenuity.  
In today’s environment it’s necessary to integrate the people which bring me to my next 
chapter which is the Life Cycle of incident activities.  The life cycle is best described as 
containing five domains within which domestic incident management activities occur: 
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VI.  THE “LIFE CYCLE” OF INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
ACTIVITIES  
HSPD-5 calls for a plan that addresses the entire universe of incident management 
from pre-incident awareness, prevention, and preparedness to post-incident response and 
recovery.  As previously mentioned, the NJDHSSP should follow this directive as well.  
 
A.  DESCRIPTIONS OF THE LIFE-CYCLE DOMAINS  
The life cycle of activities is best described as containing five domains within 
which domestic incident management activities occur: awareness, prevention, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. A key element of the domain life cycle concept is 
the recognition of the critical importance and need for continuous improvement, via 
feedback mechanisms, lessons learned, evaluations, research and development, the 
adoption of best practices, and other dynamic processes.  
1.  Awareness  
According to the National Response plan “Awareness refers to the continual 
process of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence, information, and 
knowledge to allow organizations and individuals to anticipate requirements and to react 
effectively”. It involves an interactive process of sharing, evaluating information from 
multiple sources to include the fusion of domestic and international intelligence and 
operational reports into a coherent picture. It also includes communications and reporting 
activities and activities to forecast or predict incidents and to detect and monitor threats 
and hazards. It also covers public education. Awareness activities are the bases for 
advice, alert and warning, intelligence and information-sharing, technical assistance, 
consultations, notifications, and informed decision-making at all interagency and 
intergovernmental levels, as well as with the private sector and the public.  
2.  Prevention  
Prevention refers to actions to avoid an incident, to intervene to stop an incident 
from occurring, or to mitigate an incident’s effects. It involves actions to protect lives and 
property, and defend against attacks. It involves applying intelligence and other 
information to a range of activities that may include such countermeasures as deterrence 
 38
operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance and security operations; 
investigations to determine the full nature and source of the threat; public health 
surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; and law 
enforcement operations aimed at deterring, preempting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal 
activity.  
3.  Preparedness  
Preparedness refers to the activities necessary to build and sustain performance 
across all other domains. In one sense, preparedness is part of the life cycle of a specific 
incident in that it includes a range of deliberate, time-sensitive tasks that need to occur in 
the transition from prevention to response. Preparedness can also be characterized as a 
continuous process or cycle. The mission of preparedness is to develop meaningful 
answers to the question, “Are we prepared to be aware of, to prevent, to respond to, and 
to recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies?” Preparedness 
involves efforts at all levels of government and within the private sector to identify risks 
or threats, to determine vulnerabilities, to inventory resources available to address those 
vulnerabilities, identify requirements or shortfalls, resulting in a preparedness plan to 
remedy shortfalls over time. Preparedness plans include program initiatives for planning, 
training, equipping, exercising, and evaluating capability to ensure sustainable 
performance in order to prevent, prepare for and respond to incidents.  
4.  Response  
Response refers to the activities necessary to address the immediate and short-
term effects of an incident, which focus primarily on the actions necessary to save lives, 
to protect property, and to meet basic human needs. Life-saving and life-protecting 
activities take precedence over other critical actions. Response activities include 
assessing preliminary damage and unmet needs; activating and deploying response 
resources into an affected area; providing access to and mobility within the area of 
operations; developing, coordinating, and executing an integrated incident management 
plan (which includes the activities of all response agencies); allocating existing resources 
in support of the plan and obtaining additional resources as required; and deactivation 
and standing down. It includes activities for providing basic life-support functions and 
services, triaging and treating personal injuries, minimizing damage to the environment 
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and to property, both public and private, and planning for the transition from response to 
recovery within each functional area. Response operations also include law enforcement, 
investigative, and security activities conducted to address the criminal aspects of the 
incident.  
5.  Recovery  
Recovery refers to those actions necessary to restore the community back to 
normal and to bring the perpetrators of an intentional incident to justice. It entails the 
development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-restoration plans; the 
reconstitution of government operations and services; individual, private-sector, and 
public-assistance programs to provide housing and to promote restoration; long-term care 
and treatment of affected persons: additional measures for social, political, 
environmental, and economic restoration; evaluation of the incident to identify lessons 
learned; post-incident reporting; and development of initiatives to mitigate the effects of 
future incidents. It may also include prosecution, incarceration, or other forms of 
punishment against perpetrators of intentional acts, as well as the seizure and forfeiture of 
their property (lessons learned from Katrina).  
Domain activities are neither linear nor mutually exclusive. There is no temporal 
or functional dividing line between or among domains. For example, there are broad and 
sustained awareness, prevention, and preparedness activities. There are also specific 
awareness, prevention, and preparation activities for a particular incident that can be 
undertaken while response or recovery activities are under way. Recovery operations may 
start simultaneously with response operations. Lessons learned in the conduct of activities 




















Figure 10.   Life Cycle of Incident Management Activities 
 
B.  REGIONAL MECHANISMS TO SUPPORT LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONS  
Examples of mechanisms for awareness, prevention, and preparedness, include:  
1.  Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments  
2.  Information management and intelligence coordination  
3.  Grant assistance  
4.  National training and exercise system  
The NJDHSSP should also outline mechanisms for incident management, which 
can be detailed in the MCCP. For example, the Head may (either before, during, or after 
an incident) designate Regional incident management officials to serve as the NJDHSS 
representative to oversee Regional incident management activities in the field at the 
regional, State, or local level. In certain circumstances, the Head may designate a high-
ranking Regional official to serve as the Regional senior representative in the field for the 





C.  ENSURING PRIVACY OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 
The communications model incorporates technology channels (e-mail, Internet, 
facsimile) could potentially place personal health information at risk. Health-Care 
organizations are required to adhere to Privacy Act standards, and the model must 
comply with these standards. U.S. Law requires security of health and personal data. The 
model must meet these established requirements. Confidentiality is a tool for 
safeguarding privacy. Health-care organizations are required by law to follow privacy 
and data security standards. The communications model must also comply with these 
standards. Privacy of personal medical information is ensured under the following U.S. 
laws: 
• Privacy Act of 1974 
• Copyright Act of 1976 
• Medical Records Confidentiality Act of 1995 
• Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 
• Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1999 
1. Ensuring Data Integrity 
We assure the accuracy and completeness of data by archiving and retrieval 
processes, establishment of redundant systems, and development of a disaster recovery 
plan. Once entered, data are unalterable. Archiving and retrieval processes are 
constructed so as to not allow alteration or deletion data. 
2. Security of Data Files 
Computerized records allow health care information to be accessed, copied, or 
transferred to unauthorized parties; medical information is most vulnerable when 
transported via the Internet.  Protection of data requires methods allowing only 
authorized personnel access. Security involves controlling access to information, 
protecting it from disclosure to unauthorized persons, alteration, destruction, or loss. A 




• Electronic signatures 
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3. Professional Licensure 
By using various technology channels, the communications model has the 
potential to provide services across State lines. For future implementation of Level 2 
service outside New Jersey, which can include medical triage, it should be necessary to 
define the licensure issues addressing specific State mandates or Federal models and to 
work with appropriate organizations to identify possible solutions. 
NJDHSS participated in a TOPOFF-3 exercise (April 2005), during this exercise 
communications as they relate to chain (wiring diagram), networking, and substance 
received the most comment.  Chain of communication was important, although vertical 
systems are usually very effective, lateral and diagonal networking was either not evident 
or efficient.  For example, when an issue or event took place, those in the vertical chain 
were made aware, but parallel agencies were not, in all cases, kept informed.  The result 
is a lack of information that could have a decided impact on the ability of other agencies 
to respond as needed. The inability to share information in a direct fashion, affects 
coordinated response and reduces the ability to place resources and support where they 
would be most needed (TOPOFF-3 after action report).   
The next chapter provides information about the current state of NJ 
communications and available technologies.  This chapter is necessary to address the 
communications network program and system redundancy.  During the exercise, the 
routine method of conveying information was through email--familiar and routine.  It is 
recommended that a review of networking protocols be completed at the state and local 
level so that internal, external, and cross-agency information can be shared as quickly as 
possible.  An examination of some of the county communications systems, to include 
recommended similar systems at the municipal level and state level, may be in order.   
 




VII.  AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGIES 
There are several available technologies. As part of my thesis, I was able to attend 
the 2006 National Disaster Management Systems (NDMS) conference, held in Reno 
Nevada.  During this conference I was witnessed that different systems are available to 
any State, or Region.  It is unfortunate that we are still looking at different solutions vice 
settling one solution or at least a solution that would be compatible with other programs.  
During the conference courses no one was able to identify a single product or system to 
use.  Even more surprising to me was that NDMS (during the entire conference courses) 
was never able to provide its audience with the lessons learned from previous disasters 
such as hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  They did mentioned all the disaster that occurred 
during the previous year, to include 9/11, but no one was able to identify the lessons 
learned, what have we learned from all these disasters that we can use in the future, or 
any downfalls or successes. As for the National representatives, I was quite disappointed 
to see that even the leadership is not prepared; those who are the first responders are not 
prepared for what may come next.   
Throughout my research I identified various suitable technologies but only one 
technology ‘stood out above the crowd’; is the Disaster Management Interoperability 
Services (DMIS). DMIS is not only compatible with other systems but it was also one of 
the systems identified by the U.S. government as ‘the system of choice.’   
 
A. WHAT IS DMIS 
 
Figure 11.   (From: DMIS web site) 
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The Disaster Management Interoperability Services (DMI-Services) is an integral 
part of the President's Disaster Management e-Government Initiative – a larger initiative 
focused at significantly enhancing Disaster Management on an interagency and 
intergovernmental basis. DMI-Services is primarily focused on assisting individuals and 
organizations with crisis and consequence management responsibilities for the results of 
weapons of mass destruction and disasters and mitigation of all hazards.  The primary 
mission of DMI-Services is to provide Interoperability services. DMI-Services is a 
service, not an application.  It provides a portal for rapid and secure exchange of 
information between emergency management organizations, DMI-Services connectivity 
and functionality is also applicable to prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery at 
the local, state, and federal levels. 
Those organizations that choose to use the DMI tool can benefit from preventing 
and responding to disasters.  DMI-Services' connectivity is provided through a 
connection to the Internet, whether by phone line or wireless. Access to information is 
controlled by authentication and registration process.  I was able to utilize this tool for 
several months after registering as a COG user. Data transfer is secured by the use of a 
virtual private network (VPN). DMI-Services functionality is constantly being reviewed 
and expanded to provide the best possible service to the Emergency Management 
community. 
When I initially began using the tool, it was in version 2.0 and has since been 
upgraded to version 2.2, which offers several new features and updates to enrich the 
ability of COG (Collaborative Operators Group) Operators.  In order to be in compliance 
with the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP), DMIS Alerts have been completely revised. 
These new CAP Alerts enable a COG Operator to send a message once and have it 
distributed over multiple networks using multiple formats - saving time, effort, and 
money.  The new version allows operators to create a copy of an incident record for 
future use in similar situations. Operators can use this Save a Copy functionality for 





B. WHAT ARE COGS 
1. DMI-Services Collaborative Operational Group (COG) 
COGS are a select group of operators who need to coordinate actions, 
communicate, and exchange disaster management information in a collaborative 
environment. A COG can consist of any number of Operators from multiple 
organizations who need to work together to respond to an incident.  Examples of 
organizations that may form a COG include: 
 
 
Figure 12.   COG Example (From: web site) 
 
DMI-Services functionality, exercised through COGs, supports and supplements 
existing emergency management organizations, relationships, policies, and procedures. 
 
C. HOW DO COGS WORK 
DMI-Services (DMIS) is a configurable set of tools that allows information to be 
shared throughout the professional emergency management community. In order to 
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improve communication and coordination during disasters, local DMI-Services 
Administrators and Operators need to understand how DMIS works and become familiar 
with its options through regular use.  The ability of a COG Administrator to assign 
Operator roles and permissions, coupled with the ability to establish multiple COG 
organizations, enables organizations involved in emergency management to collaborate 
and exchange data at a given level and in an environment that suits their particular needs. 
 
Figure 13.   COG Administrative View 
 
When deciding how to organize one or more COGs, officials must determine 
what levels of collaboration they require on a regular basis, and consider how operating 
procedures may change in response to a larger-scaled incident.  Potential variations of an 
organization’s approach to establishing their COG are as numerous and complex as the 
organizations that play a role in consequence management. DMI-Services’ flexibility in 
assigning roles and privileges should support many possible configurations. 
 
D. DOES IT MATTER WHO IS A MEMBER OF A COG 
Yes, it matters who is a member of a COG. Being a member of the same COG 
enables easier and more complete collaboration based on assigned DMI-Services roles 
and permissions.  Operators of the same COG can see data as it is being refreshed 
through the Save command.  To share information with a member of another COG, an 
operator must post the information to that COG. Also, the COG that receives the posted 
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information cannot change or edit posted information. However, they can read it, respond 
to it, and export data from it for import into their own applications.  For example, let's say 
the EOC Manager and another member of the same COG are collaborating on a map. The 
two operators can see each other's changes when the Save command is selected. In order 
to share the map with an operator in another COG, the operator must post a copy of the 
Incident containing the map to that COG (assuming the operator has post permission). 
The operator of the ‘receiving’ COG can edit a separate layer of the map (the 
layer belonging to his/her COG) and the operator in the originating COG should be able 
to view the markings in the working version of the incident. While an Operator cannot 
make changes to the layer belonging to another COG(s), he can use the markup as a 
guide to make changes to the layer(s) on the map. 
 
 





E. THINGS TO KEEP IN MIND WHEN SETTING UP A COG 
When setting up a COG, we must keep in mind which operators need to 
collaborate and how often. COGs can use DMI-Services to communicate in two ways: 
internal collaboration and external sharing. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Internal Collaboration  (From: DMIS Program)  
 
1. Internal Collaboration 
COG members can collaborate internally with their working group. That is, COG 
members with appropriate permissions work in a shared environment where changes are 
seen by everyone with the appropriate permissions in the COG as the data is refreshed 
(which is when an Operator saves their changes). 
2. External Sharing 
When COGs have a need to communicate externally, they can “post” information. 
Only the COGs that they select during the post process can view the information.  COGs 
that receive posted information cannot change or edit posted information. However, they 
can read it, respond to it, and export data from it for import into their own applications.  
When starting a COG, it may be helpful to train a small “core” of users to assist the 
Administrator.  Install DMI-Services at a few selected locations and conduct small table-
top exercises using current processes and one (1) central DMI-Services Operator.  As 




F. IMAGE TREND INC.   
The Image Trend Resource Bridge is a web based application allowing for 
constant access to emergency related logistics.  The Resource Bridge is used for hospital 
bed and resource allocation, pharmaceutical tracking, and monitoring diversion status in 
situations ranging from multiple-vehicle accidents to mass casualty alerts to daily 
operations.  Special resource requests range from specific medial supply inventory to 
specialized doctors to bed availability.  The basis of this resource allocation system is a 
database driven application which records all statistics relating to hospital beds and 
resources by category, type and status along with hospital demographics.  The monitoring 
of this system allows for comprehensive reporting, allocation, and sharing of available 
beds, supplies, personnel and other resources within regions of any size from city, 
county, state or federal levels. 
Individual views provide hospital summaries, geographical information, and 
more. Real-time search capabilities provide immediate status information and assignment 
possibilities. Through an alert notification capability users are made immediately aware 
of potential allocation requirements and can assess the immediate availability.  
The intuitive Web-based interface of this system provides easy accessibility for 
various users: varying from government agencies to hospital administrators. Rights and 
permissions are assigned to maintain the integrity of the system. A further advantage 
realized through this system is straightforward content accessibility of all related 
information in the knowledgebase. This can involve such things as Emergency 
Preparedness Procedures and other references.  
1. Statewide Management Console 
The Resource Bridge Statewide Management Console enables administration and 
an aggregate view of all participating facilities. The basis of this resource allocation 
system is a database driven application that records all statistics relating to beds by 
category, type and status along with hospital demographics. The monitoring of this 
system allows for comprehensive reporting, allocation and sharing of available beds 
within a region of any size from city, county, state, or federal levels.  
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2. Facility Management Dashboard 
The Facility Management Dashboard is the primary input tool that enables 
facilities to provide data on available resources. Individual views provide hospital 
summaries, geographical information, and more. Real-time search capabilities provide 
immediate status information and assignment possibilities. Through an alert notification 
capability users are made immediately aware of potential allocation requirements and can 
assess the immediate availability. 
 
G. TVI CORPORATION 
TVI Corporation is the leading manufacturer of rapidly deployable, 
chemical/Biological/Hazmat decontamination systems for military, public health, and 
first response agencies. All integrated shelter systems employ TVI’s articulating frame 
which is covered by one or more patents. They also offer a wide assortment of 
accessories to support the users of our shelter systems, such as trailers, air heaters, water 
heaters, and air filter systems for chemical and biological filtration. TVI has supplied 
shelters and related concepts utilizing their own patented, specialized fabric processing 
technology to first responders and the military for over two decades. In addition, TVI is 
the leading supplier of thermal targets for military training and testing, and has also 


































Figure 17.   Bethesda Naval Hospital Exercise 
 
H. INTELLIGENT PERSONAL ASSISTANT 
During my XML class we worked on a project that was based in the use of XML.  
The project envisioned all emergency service personnel to be equipped with specialized 
PDA’s or cell phones which should act as intelligent personal assistants. Towards this, 
they propose to adopt and adapt their iPA (Intelligent Personal Assistant) framework. iPA 
was developed to aid its user in a ubiquitous computing environment. They designed it to 
run on a mobile platform (PDA or cell phone) in order to stay with its user at all times, 
even when she/he is mobile. Over time, an iPA “learns” about its user, building a profile 
to improve its own behavior with the goal of becoming a better personal assistant. It can 
gather, sort, and present information tailored to its user’s current activities. To help 
protect its user’s privacy, it never shares this profile with anyone. 
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An iPA does not require its user to ask for anything. Instead, it “learns” from what 
it observes from its user’s actions and from anything it was “told” explicitly. Using this 
information, it should let its user know when something important or relevant is found, 
even when not asked. In this way, it becomes knowledgeable about everything going on 
and knows what its user wants to hear about at the right time and place. 
In addition to the profile, an iPA also tailors its information gathering and 
delivery based on its user’s current context. Context information includes current day and 
time, the user’s location and possibly the current task being performed by the user. 
Location can be determined via GPS or similar positioning system if available, or from 
queries to nearby sensor networks. Additionally, context can incorporate other conditions 
supplied by the user, the current environment, or even different users and their activities 
and statistics. 
An iPA gathers information from a variety of sources. These can include servers, 
both query-response and broadcast and other iPA peers. Servers could include standard 
database and web servers, as well as sensor networks.  
Broadcast servers would ideally consist of two main channels. The first channel is 
a push-based channel that continuously broadcasts a data stream of XML documents. The 
other channel is a pull-based channel where the user or iPA can submit queries to the 
server requesting more detailed information about an item in the broadcast. 
In the proposed scheme, it is the iPAs that should receive broadcast workflows 
from various crisis centers. Based on its profile, context, and user’s current activities, the 
iPA should filter these requests and only present those that its user could participate in. 
The iPA must know its user’ abilities and preferences in order to be able to match 
requests accordingly. Originally, the iPA was targeted towards a commerce environment. 
This involved monitoring the habits and preferences of the user regarding restaurant 
choices and product purchases, tailored to different contexts. Any XML advertisement 
received was only given to the user depending on how well it matched these preferences, 
given the current user context.  In a crisis management environment, the iPA instead 
needs to identify the capabilities and skills of the user. One way to do this is to keep 
statistics on the experience of the user by monitoring the incidents the user participates 
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in. In this way, when an XML workflow is received, its skill requirements can be 
matched to the expertise of the user, again taking into account the current context. 
1. System Architecture  
The Figure below shows a high-level view of the proposed communication 
architecture. Police, fire department and other services’ headquarter (HQ) buildings are 
connected with each other and with government authorities, e.g. the state governor, by 
terrestrial and/or satellite networks.  Likewise, when disaster site command posts are 
established, they are connected by terrestrial wireless or satellite links to the respective 
HQ. For “hot spot” on-site communications, a wireless LAN (infrastructure, ad hoc, or 
both) is set up. Firefighters and other personnel may be equipped with personal or body 
area networks, providing connectivity for sensors and terminal displays.  The information 
flow of applications can be both horizontal, i.e. between peer entities, and vertical, i.e. 
along an organization’s hierarchy and beyond; both push and pull information 
propagation are to be supported. 
 
Figure 18.   Communication Architecture Sketch (From: EIC) 
 
During a crisis communication can be difficult, as communication may be 
unreliable, and the personnel may be scattered over different locations (and areas) and 
engaged in different activities. Many would be detained or unavailable entirely.  Instead 
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of locating and contacting individuals directly, the project envisions an environment 
where the agency can broadcast electronically its plan of action. This broadcast should be 
received by both the appropriate centers as well as any available personnel through their 
mobile devices (e.g., PDA's), and those able to contribute to the execution of the plan can 
respond electronically. In the figure above for example, the fire station can broadcast a 
requirement for a number of police officers to go to a building to aid in its evacuation. 
Any officers that receive the broadcast and are able to go can reply to the call. The 
agency chooses those most suited from all responders, and confirms their participation. In 
this way, teams of emergency personnel are dynamically formed based on the 
requirements of executing different plans of action for the emergency situation at hand. 
During the actual execution of these plans, it may become necessary to modify 
them. This can be due to many reasons, such as environmental changes (e.g., a building 
collapses or fire erupts); team members being drawn off for more critical tasks, 
unforeseen obstacles or delays, and so on. In order to handle such a change, all team 
members must be alerted, along with any monitoring centers.  Using an electronic 
broadcast to communicate with emergency personnel provides many advantages, with 
improved security being one of them. With “smart” PDA’s, secure data communication 
becomes very inexpensive (since it is software-based), compared to the purchasing of 
specialized “secure” voice communication devices (e.g., military-grade walkie-talkies), 
which are very expensive. In this way, sensitive information and details about the 
emergency at hand can be transmitted to all those that could help. In addition to the 
improved security, using PDA’s allows for the emergency broadcast to reach a much 
greater pool of people, which could include for example off-duty personnel or doctors 
who may not be monitoring a radio or carrying around a bulky walkie-talkie, but can 
conveniently keep a small PDA that also has other uses. This allows such people to 
become “first responders”, if they are located closer to the site of the emergency, and thus 
drastically improve the quality of the emergency response. 
2. Coordination, Monitoring, and Execution 
Coordination and monitoring during the crisis involves the interaction of many 
different systems and individuals.  Crisis centers must manage their overall workflows. 
This involves monitoring the progress of execution, receiving notifications from the 
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personnel involved, and forwarding revisions as necessary.  The centers can coordinate 
with the individuals receive updated instructions, revised workflows, and queries. IPAs 
notify their users only as necessary, so as not to be too distracting. They can report to the 
center the current status and context of their users, and notify them of any failures or 
constraint violations. In some cases they can even anticipate violations or failures given 
current conditions and known properties. They should also report successful completions 
of tasks. 
In the event an iPA or its user determines changes to the current workflow are 
necessary, the iPA can help by providing alternatives that still satisfy all requirements. If 
the iPA’s user has sufficient authority, he/she can select one of these alternatives. The 
iPA should automatically notify the center and any other personnel involved. Otherwise; 
alternatives should be forwarded to the center for selection or approval. 
In addition to helping with coordination, iPAs provide other valuable assistance 
during workflow execution. They provide an interface to information sources and fellow 
emergency personnel. Queries to various sensor networks can be initiated through an 
iPA. This can help with tasks such as locating victims, avoiding obstructions, and 
detecting dangerous environmental conditions. Since iPAs are highly personalized, 
information is tailored to the current specific needs of the user. 
The greatest advantages of using an iPA for such applications are its own 
“initiative” and context awareness. Appropriate assistance can be initiated by the iPA 
itself, as it constantly monitors data streams for relevant information, thus freeing its user 
to work more effectively. Knowledge of what to monitor can be based on properties of 
the workflow being executed, or on observed information (e.g., from queries made by the 
user in the past).  
 
I. EMERGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE 
Another tool that NJDHSS should considers is the used of the Government 
Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) that provides Federal, State and local 
government National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) users with a 
ubiquitous switched voice and voice-band data communications service. GETS is used 
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during periods of natural or man-made disasters or emergencies that cause congestion or 
network outages. GETS is an emergency telecommunications service and is designed to 
be used when NS/EP personnel are unable to complete emergency calls through their 
regular telecommunications means.  
The backbone for GETS is the Public Switched Network (PSN) because of its 
survivability, ease of use, availability, robustness, reliability, and technological currency. 
GETS can be accessed through the Federal Telecommunications Service (FTS), the 
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service (DTS) and Defense Information System 
Network (DISN) and is maintained in a constant state of readiness which maximizes the 
use of all available telephone resources in the event of congestion or outages caused by 
emergency, crisis, or war.   Highlights of GETS Features: 
Access Authorization: GETS access control is accomplished through the use of 
Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) to ensure only authorized users gain access to 
GETS features and protect against fraud.  
Enhanced Routing: GETS calls use extensive enhancements to the PSN's robust 
network of interconnecting paths between switches. With these enhancements to the grid 
of multiple switch connections, numerous switch failures in the PSN could occur without 
any disruptions of GETS calls.  
Priority Treatment:  High Probability of Completion Identifier that is carried 
across the signaling network and used to trigger priority features such as trunk queuing 
and trunk reservation. Exemption from restrictive network management controls used to 




Figure 19.   GETS System (From GETS Brochure) 
 
If there is a network outages in the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 
then a Wireless Priority Service (WPS) would be used, the goal of a WPS is to provide an 
end-to-end nationwide wireless priority communications capability to key national 
security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP).  Eligible users are key Federal, state, 
local, and tribal government and critical industry personnel who have NS/EP missions. 
WPS is complementary to, and most effective when used in conjunction with, the 
Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) to ensure a high 
probability of call completions in both the wire line and wireless portions of the PSTN. 
WPS serves NS/EP needs while minimizing impact on consumer access to the public 
wireless infrastructure.  
Increased cellular phone usage by the general public in emergency situations 
regularly results in extreme network congestion, preventing key national security and 
emergency response personnel from obtaining network access. In emergency situations 
when wire line networks are damaged, cellular telephones often provide the primary 
means of communication, increasing congestion even further. In the year 2000, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a Report and Order (R&O) for 
Priority Access Service (PAS) authorizing wireless carriers to offer the service on a 
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voluntary basis and with much needed liability protections. Following the September 11 
attacks, the White House directed delivery of a wireless priority service to persons with 
leadership responsibilities during emergency situations.  
Highlights:  
¾ WPS is an enhancement to basic cellular service that allows NS/EP calls 
to queue for the next available radio channel. The full WPS capability, 
which began deployment in early 2004, when used with GETS, should 
provide priority handling from the origination, through the network, to the 
called destination.  
¾ WPS is invoked by dialing 272 prior to the destination number on cellular 
instruments that have been subscribed to the WPS feature.  
¾ WPS costs are a one-time activation charge of no more than $10, a service 
fee of no more than $4.50 per month, and no more than a $.75 per minute 
usage fee for WPS (272) calls. These charges represent the maximum 
amounts charged by the cellular carrier and may be lower; contact your 
carrier for current rates.  
¾ WPS is currently available nationwide in all of the AT&T Wireless, 
Nextel, and T-Mobile service areas that utilize GSM technology.  
¾ Verizon Wireless and Sprint PCS are planning to offer WPS when 
modifications to their technology can be made, estimated for late 2006.  
 
J. THE WORLD IS FLAT 
 According to Thomas L. Friedman, the world is flat because several technological 
and political forces have converged, and that has produced a global, Web-enabled playing 
field that allows for multiple forms of collaboration without regard to geography or 
distance - or soon, even language.  We are no longer restricted by geographical 
boundaries or wire technology.  Wireless technology like "steroids," pumped up 
collaboration, making it mobile and personal. 
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 The DMIS Interoperability Backbone is a web service that provides responders 
with communication tools that allow them to share information with other responder 
organizations. Responder groups receive and transmit information over the web, enabling 
them to rapidly develop and exchange incident information with other responder 
organizations. This capability of sharing incident information gives all responders greater 
knowledge of a particular disaster event by leveraging technology to gain efficiency.  
This gained efficiency allows responders to: 
¾ Gain Early Awareness 
¾ Better Coordinate Response Among Organizations 
¾ Save More Lives 
¾ Minimize Property Damage  
In addition, the Interoperability Backbone provides communication among all responder 
organizations that register with DMI- Services. NJDHSS and Navy Medicine will be able 
to share information and communicate with: 
¾ Local Responder Organizations 
¾ Statewide Responder Organizations 
¾ Regional Responder Organizations 
¾ National Responder Organizations 
¾ Non-Governmental Responder Organizations 
 Any system that renders itself "DMIS-enabled" by developing its side of the 
interface to the DMIS Interoperability Backbone can share information with the DMIS 
Tools and with any other DMIS-enabled system "plugged in" to the Backbone. DMIS 
publishes the interface specifications used by external systems developers to "build their 
plug." Some systems have built their side of the interface in less than 2 weeks.  DMIS 
tools and services are exposed to cooperating non-DMIS applications using open 











           




Figure 20.   Proposed Infrastructure 
 
Reliability of communications by either military or civilian personnel is a must.  
The ability to share information between military and civilian entities is very important.  
From the technologies researched my conclusion is that DMIS is the system of choice  
not only for the New Jersey DHSS but also for Navy Medicine as explained in the next 
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VIII. NAVY MEDICINE SYSTEM 
A. MEDICAL CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT AND STATUS TOOL (M-
CAST) 
M-Cast applies specific and defined capabilities against requirements of program 
standards providing a standard measure of readiness for a given capability.  Capabilities 
as viewed in this system represent smallest unit teams or squads performing specific 
functions required for a hazard type.  While being applied to specific emergency 
management capabilities, the program standards have broader applicability to capabilities 
in general.  Specifically, capabilities for response to chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) incidents should be measured against 
program standards and their objectives for an “all hazards” approach to emergency 
management.  The lowest point at which threshold requirements of the standard are not 
met determines the level of “readiness” of a specific capability.  Capability sets are 
grouped based on their level of criticality including “Baseline” assets (day-to-day 
functions), “Core” response capabilities (that must be “ready” and are measured and 
tracked), “Contingency” capabilities (that are task-organized to meet requirements from 
either baseline assets and core capabilities, or built during response to pre-set program 
standards), and “Reactionary” capabilities (that can be developed to meet extraordinary 
requirements).  This information was released by BUMED for this thesis purpose; this 
information should not be release to other contractors since this contract has not been 
awarded as of today. 
Core Group capabilities in compliance with the program standards are in a partial 
or fully “mission capable” status.  The set of capabilities for a specific hazard response 
type (e.g., chemical attack) that are “ready” serve as a measure of “preparedness”.  
“Responsiveness” measures the geospatial time factors from notification to mission 
ready.  Deploy ability measures the ease of deploying, including factors such as weight 
and cube, ruggedness of gear, and logistical support requirements, and capability donor 




equipment, and resources of that capability.  Utility captures the combination of these 
factors and the impact to the donor, facilitating selection of the best available capabilities 
for a response.   
Applied to hazard vulnerability assessments, critical infrastructure programs, and 
intelligence assessments, readiness and preparedness levels can provide information on 
vulnerability and be used to assess risk mitigated by having a capability, giving insight 
into capability effectiveness.  Combined with cost, this allows determination of funding 
priorities for capability development. Through an iterative process, the tool can be vetted 
against local, regional, and national threat and hazard vulnerability assessments, adjusting 
the program standards or capability sets as needed to minimize risk.   
Application of “lessons identified” from objective exercise assessments, or from 
evidence-based data collected from actual responses, and items from vulnerability 
assessments, form the basis for a continuous process improvement function.  Analysis 
leads to changes in program management through adjustment of weighting factors 
applied to program standards and objectives, adding or deleting capabilities, adding or 
deleting objectives, adjusting readiness or preparedness thresholds, or refinement of the 
calculus for readiness and related qualities of the capabilities.  Because capabilities are 
standardized and measured, metrics data and outcome data can be analyzed to isolate 
individual factors for their significance as the system matures.  For example, the specific 
distribution of readiness scoring can be compared to lessons learned, outcomes, and 
identified measures of effectiveness in the process improvement function to identify 
specific factors that can be changed. 
Operational risk management principles guide the use of capabilities to meet 
given requirements, based on readiness, responsiveness, deploy ability, and utility.  These 
metrics and data can also provide significant insight into logistical support, time-phased 
force deployment data (TPFDD) requirements, and cost of response, as well as overall 
program management, and development of the common operational picture.   
The National Response Plan (NRP) outlines further in detail the application of our 
national strategy for responding to incidents of national significance including roles and 
responsibilities of coordinating and cooperating agencies.  Promulgation of a National 
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Incident Management System (NIMS) with its focus on integration and a national 
resource typing system has given a further detail to development of a standardized, 
systematic approach for a national response strategy.  National Preparedness Goals seek 
to further refine this process.  Identifying the complexities of the coordination, 
integration, and interoperability requirements and capturing them in information 
management tools that are useful becomes a challenge, akin to the beginnings of the 
construction of the “Borg” of Star Trek fame.  Capturing all of the critical elements into a 
system requires recognizing the multidimensional, layered approach now capable of 
being managed only with elegant information technology tools.  Without developing a 
systems architecture based on clearly defined and standardized objectives and 
requirements, such preparedness goals should not be met.  Knowing where a response 
team is and what capability it is required to have is not sufficient.  Readiness metrics 
must be defined, applied, and measured to those teams and considered carefully in order 
to perform necessary operational risk management decisions.  In emergency 
management, using the available assets in developing and managing a response to given 
requirements requires knowing the current status of those assets and what the risk is in 
using the given capabilities across a “capabilities gap” to meet operational requirements.   
The Medical Capabilities Assessment and Status Tool (M-CAST) provides a 
capabilities-based management system for task-organizing response teams for an “all 
hazards” emergency management program. It identifies critical program standards and 
indexes them against a range of capabilities grouped for specific mission or hazard type, 
organized in a matrix format (see Figure below). The technique is broadly applicable to 
any capabilities-based planning system, capturing critical elements through algorithms 
based on the standards and capabilities.  A program standard is a defined objective that 
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Figure 21.   Standards (From M-CAST Program) 
 
Objectives of the program standards provide further detail and definition.  Rank-
ordering the program standards properly provides a framework for measuring “readiness” 
for a given capability.   Applying weighting factors to program standards and objectives 
provides a way to assign significance to specific elements (e.g., critical equipment, 
critical team members, critical training) that are identified as having greater impact on 
capability readiness.  Summing up points of the product of weighting factor and score 
provides a “Readiness Factor”, RF.  
Capabilities represent the combination of properly equipped, trained, and 
organized personnel and assets ready to integrate into a response applied to given 
requirements.  Functionally, they represent squads, teams, or units that perform the basic, 
elemental actions on an objective without any mixing or cross over of function.  For 
example, a decontamination team does not perform triage or treatment of patients, only 
the decontamination function.  These can be defined and standardized through a national 
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resource typing system or categorized through “unit type codes” for consistency across 
programs.  As an individual capability meets more of the program standards, it achieves 
greater readiness and should have a higher readiness factor.  Exceeding program 
standards is done so at the expense of the institution and does not qualify for extra credit 
in the readiness factor or more funds from a centrally managed program unless an 
exception or exemption is made.  It would, however, be noted and visible to the system 
that additional capability exists.  The capabilities are further divided into Capability 
Groups defined as “Baseline”, “Core”, “Contingency”, and “Reactionary” depending on 
the determined effectiveness for a given capability.  These groups then define the level of 
adherence required against the program standards, allowing optimal management under 
given fiscal constraints, as described below.  Groups are divided into classes based on 
whether they are Hazard Specific, defining specialized capabilities for specific hazard 
types, or Functional, requiring coordinated actions across the entire institution.  Types 
define the specific set of capabilities required for responding to such an incident.  
As more capabilities achieve readiness, their sum capability provides greater 
“preparedness” for a given institution such that preparedness can be defined as the sum of 
capability readiness for a given capability set.  Through checks, rights, and visibility, 
management at various layers within a hierarchical chain of command can provide 
oversight to accomplish critical tasks appropriate to that layer of management.  Using 
warning flags and reports, deficiencies in meeting program standards allow real-time 
assessment of readiness and preparedness, better operational risk management decisions 
to be made, and a mechanism for measuring the effectiveness of program standards and 
capability definitions.  Using the sustainment standard to capture cost, risk-based 
programming can help determine in which set a given capability should be placed.  
For the purposes of this discussion, a response requirement represents a tasker, an 
implied or specified mission, or planned response assigned to an institution (e.g., military 
branch of service, a department, an installation, medical center, hospital, clinic, etc.), that 
owns or manages a capability.   
1. Capability Classification Scheme 
Capabilities for programs (e.g., Antiterrorism, Force Protection, and Emergency 
Management), local plans, operations, or functions (e.g., emergency support functions) 
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are designated in Groups defining their required level of preparedness.  These should be 
classified further into Hazard Specific or Functional classes.  These should then be typed 
into specific hazard or response Types (and sub-types) of capability sets to designate 
which capabilities are maintained, sustained, and subject to inspection, defined below. 
Baseline Group—those skills, functions, or actions performed on a daily basis or 
with well established program oversight.  These are governed by standards such as 
credentialing and privileging, licensing, certifications, etc., and include conventional 
mass casualty response capabilities that are based on everyday skills.  Hazard specific 
class includes those that require very specific actions, are usually drilled in sections or 
covered in employee training, and are represented by the DoD standard color-coded 
types.  Baseline Functional Types identify those that require broad participation or affect 
the institution on a broad scale.  This includes the day to day operations and structure of 
departments, divisions, sections, and watches.  Sub-types define those types that require 
further division to more manageable chunks.  For example, C4ISR (command & control, 
communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) would require 
sub-typing to more manageable pieces. 
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Capability Sets Classification System
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Figure 22.   Capability Sets Classification System (From M-CAST Program) 
 
Core Group--represent those capabilities that must be in a “ready” posture 
meeting the program standards defined by C MORE TEAMS, are subject to inspection, 
are used for planning and plans development including mutual aid agreements and 
memoranda of understanding, and remain visible to the hierarchical chain for overall 
readiness management, preparedness, planning, and response. Core group capabilities are 
further divided into either hazard specific classes or functional classes depending on 
whether they involve specific response elements or general, institution-wide response.  
These are further classified into specific types.  Each type should consist of the set of 
capabilities organized at the team(s), squad(s), or unit level comprising that incident 
response capability.  Those in the Core Group should be monitored by the flagging, 
warning, and reporting system (see below).  For “Core CBRN” (chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear) such capabilities as “Triage and Treatment”, “Medical Transport”, 
“Decontamination”, “Detection/ ID” are included and differentiated from non-CBRN sets 
due to the need for following additional statutory code and guidelines related to training 
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for and working in hazardous environments.  These drive the need for specialized training 
and equipment such as personal protective equipment (e.g., chemical suits, gas masks, 
gloves, and boots), detection equipment, and decontamination equipment.   
 
Capability Sets Classification System











































EPI= Epidemiological Investigation Team
PHEO= Public Health Emergency Officer
 
Figure 23.   Classification System (From M-CAST Program) 
 
Contingent Group—those capabilities that might be called upon to meet 
requirements of an incident response but either essentially meet program standards 
through other capabilities in the baseline and core sets, or are desirable capabilities to 
have, but not prioritized high enough to warrant funding.  Contingent set capabilities are 
pre-defined and may be used for planning purposes in pre-incident phases; however, they 
do not require monitoring via the program standards until they are formed, are not subject 
to inspection, are not exercised, and are not funded.  For example, baseline capabilities 
could be organized after an incident to meet requirements calling for specific medical 
capabilities such as surgical specialties, nursing, public health specialists, etc. where 
standards are based on their credentialed privileges, certifications, and/or qualifications.  
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While these would not require monitoring through the M-CAST program standards pre-
incident, the tool would provide visibility for planning, team design to specified program 
standards, and accountability during response.  Additionally, program standards and 
objectives promotes a more comprehensive consideration of ancillary requirements that 
may improve the “capability” (e.g., deploying technicians as part of a team, developing 
equipment lists for “go bags”, selecting personnel with proper training, etc.).  Below are 
Contingent Group Capability Types. 
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Figure 24.   Capability Classification System (From M-CAST Program) 
 
Reactionary Group—built essentially from baseline and core capabilities in 
response to a given incident, standards and objectives are defined through either local or 
central management on-the-fly, so that capabilities are developed around defined, 
minimal standards.  Risk management provides opportunity to justify exceptions that are 
made in developing the capability and are documented in a risk assessment developed 
with assistance of the tool providing visibility on training, certifications, and experience 
of personnel, equipment sets, and impact to donating entities.  Construction of the 
response teams to given program standards with appropriate visibility provided to 
planners, logisticians, and the chain of command should improve the common operating 




2. Program Standards 
The tool defines given capabilities against program standards captured in the 
acronym C MORE TEAMS©, (referring to the ability of the system to provide visibility 
on capabilities available in response and the ability to build more teams relatively easily). 
• Capability is defined in local and higher level policy 
• Manpower assigned by roster 
• Organized within chain of command 
• Recognized with horizontal integration, interoperability 
• Equipped with approved/ certified equipment 
• Trained and certified or qualified as needed 
• Exercised with external entity 
• Assessed with AAR and LL’s feedback loop 
• Maintained training and equipment program 
• Sustained with ongoing funding 
Objectives to the program standards should further define the characteristics of 
the capabilities, allowing for standardized, centralized resource typing according to 
current doctrine, policy, guidelines, and best practices. Variance from program standards 
is by exception or allowance.  The tool should allow for updates and changes as they 
occur by making changes in the programs standards and objectives.  It also should alert 
managers as to specific areas impacted by those changes through an embedded warning, 
reporting, and flagging system (see below).  Capabilities and resources should be defined 
in accordance with the national resource typing system described in the NIMS where 
available.  The controls in the program standards define the limits of decentralization of 
decision making authority and can be updated as dictated through a continuous quality 
improvement process and evolution of the tool.   Appendix B lists current capability 
standards definitions. 
Capability captures policy, scope, purpose, mission, and basic concept of 
operations for a given capability requirement.  In the final form, hyperlinks provide 
immediate access to pertinent references requiring a given capability and the objectives.  
Links to institutional level plans describe where specific capabilities should be employed 
at the institutional (and/or installation) level. 
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Manning provides the roster of personnel, including alternates, with pertinent 
associated information allowing for logistical support, personnel accountability, 
“readiness” (in the military this includes things like “C-status”), and data for 
development of time phased force deployment data (TPFDD).  Position Descriptions 
designate key positions, to include the team or squad leader, assistant, supply manager, 
training manager, equipment manager, maintenance manager, and any unique positions 
required for a given capability.  Depending on the size of the team or squad, or the 
responsibilities, members may hold more than one position.  Line of succession is also 
designated by the roster numbering scheme.  Personnel may be on more than one 
capability, but must meet training requirements for all on which they are listed, and must 
be substituted if conflicts are identified between capability employments.  Algorithms 
should determine which capabilities represent potential or absolute conflicts and should 
not designate the same personnel (e.g., a person should not be assigned to a decon team 
and triage team for chemical incident mass casualty response) and should be flagged or 
disallowed.  Appropriate personnel data should be pulled from the appropriate 
administrative databases able to provide the required data fields.  Read and write rights 
should be determined to prevent inappropriate access to personal data (see below).  
Manning rosters should be linked to training files with the appropriate training records 
for an assigned capability visible.  Accountability data should provide biographical 
identification capability to ensure compliance with Antiterrorism (AT) and Force 
Protection (FP) Program standards.  Visibility of institution personnel with respect to 
readiness and training status should aid in filtering of the available manpower pool for 
assignment of properly trained and equipped team members. 
Organization defines the command and control within the incident management 
system including vertical integration and reporting requirements, or operational chain of 
command (CoC).  It also includes the administrative and tactical chains of command, if 
separate from the operational CoC, and hierarchical management, communications 
protocols, and succession plan. 
Recognition comprises horizontal integration and interoperability issues--how 
given capabilities interface with other capabilities, capturing those issues in terms of, for 
example, sharing of equipment, command and control, communications, oversight, 
 74
operational authority, chain of custody, and continuity of care (for example, who has 
medical oversight of patients through the decontamination process when there may be no 
medical providers on the decontamination team). Tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTP) are maintained here.  Check lists of critical action items for personnel associated 
with the capability, including the job action sheets of the Hospital Incident Command 
System (HICS), are maintained here and updated based on assessments and as needed.  
As an example, the integration of the formal decontamination capability with the triage 
and treatment capability establishes such protocols as medical oversight of patients 
through processes, intervention procedures, patient hand-off techniques and 
responsibilities, and command and control.  Mutual aid agreements (MAA), 
Memorandum of Understandings (MOU), and Memorandum of Agreements (MOA) are 
referenced and copies maintained here. 
Equipment and supply lists specific equipment and supply lists for given 
capabilities either as the specific list or as a family of systems from which to choose.  
Communications gear and plans are noted here, cross-linked with the protocols in the 
Organization Program Standard.  Minimum standards are promulgated for inspection 
purposes, and deviation is by exception from proper authority as designated within the 
specifics of the program.  Actual equipment and supplies on hand with proper storage 
location, condition, and status are captured here. Comparison is made against the 
specified equipment list or family of systems, with deviations and exceptions noted in the 
tickler, warning, and reporting system (see below).   
Training is determined by minimum standard requirements as designated by a 
given program’s requirement or standard and recorded as “qualified” for a given skill.  
This qualification has sustainment training requirements that must be met.  It also 
qualifies this person system-wide as long as it is maintained.  For example, Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA) provide minimum training standards for first responders, first receivers 
(guidelines), and hazardous materials workers and likely provide the minimum standard 
for “certification” or “qualification” purposes.  Minimum standards are determined for a 
given manning position, as is sustainment, advanced, and expert (train the trainer) level 
training.  Training data pulled from appropriate databases should compare completed 
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training to training requirements for the role being filled and note deficiencies.  
Credentialing and privileging information should be included in accordance with 
appropriate requirements.  Training is also cumulative and cross applicable, such that 
training for one capability may be applicable towards the training requirements of other 
capabilities.  This allows managers to identify specific training (such as specific 
equipment training) that can be done easily to expand the potential personnel assets for 
various capabilities.  Relative Value Units (RVU’s), which capture equivalency time for 
training against that for clinical time, should be captured and appropriately coded for a 
given capability such that specific capabilities requiring more training should reflect the 
number of RVU’s required.   On-the-job training during actual incidents should be at the 
discretion of managers with the appropriate expertise and experience after making the 
proper risk assessment. 
Exercises are recorded in terms of duration, frequency, participation, and goals.  
Duration captures time spent during exercises and counts towards practical application 
training requirements for qualification and/or certification purposes.  Frequency is 
determined by program standards, again established by the most stringent requirements to 
which the institution adheres.  For example, medical institutions adhering to Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) standards would 
schedule to meet those exercise requirements even if they exceeded higher authority 
military requirements.  Participation includes all capabilities exercised with annotation of 
outside organizations included for interoperability purposes.  Goals shall include itemized 
issues for action from previous assessment lessons identified that are to be assessed and 
are included in the exercise master event scenario list (MESL), designed to test 
components of universal task list (UTL), a standard list of tasks responders in specific 
positions must be able to accomplish.  Military service specific requirements at the 
installation and/ or regional level would be factored into the exercise goals.  Various 
other programs of record might also drive the frequency, duration, participation, or goals 
(e.g., Emergency Management Program, CBRNE Installation Preparedness Programs, 
Anti-terrorism/ Force Protection Programs, or Critical Infrastructure Programs, and may 
do so at various hierarchical levels (e.g., installation, regional, headquarters). 
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Assessments of training, exercises, and inspections are captured as a formal 
program standard and are submitted in the form of After Action Reports (AAR) or 
Lessons Identified, and are used to develop, evaluate, modify or validate program 
standards and objectives for the capabilities.  These are entered into a formal continuous 
quality improvement program ensuring they are reviewed, with issue items assigned as 
action items with designated personnel charged to address them within a given time 
frame, and recorded for later inspection.  These are then included in the next exercise 
master event scenario list (MESL) for evaluation during the next exercise.  Review is also 
conducted at the central headquarters level by an MCAST oversight committee to 
incorporate changes into the tool and transition lessons identified to Lessons Learned 
through a formalized mechanism.  Lessons learned are then documented with date/time 
group, rationale, and associated change to the system (see below).  A lesson identified is 
not a lesson learned until it has been processed completely through the formal continuous 
improvement process and an outcome designated.   
Maintenance refers to equipment and supply storage management.  Each 
capability with equipment has an assigned maintenance manager and equipment manager 
charged with ensuring proper maintenance is conducted, and proper storage maintained.  
Maintenance schedules are tied to the tickler, warning, and reporting system.  
Availability (Ao):  Operational availability is calculated as Ao = Mean Time Between 
Maintenance ÷ (Mean Time Between Maintenance + Mean Down Time which includes 
Logistics Delay Time, Admin Delays and Mean time To Repair). Training maintenance is 
maintained by the training manager and reflected there; however, costs are rolled up 
under the Maintenance Program Standard. 
Sustainment of the program through proper budgeting for adherence to program 
standards must be demonstrated.  This includes operations and maintenance funding, 
equipment life-cycle replacement costs, supplies, training, exercise, and assessment costs 
including relative value unit (RVU) costs.  Sustainment figures are used in risk-based 
cost benefit analysis for capabilities as well as for estimates of logistical support during 
operations.  Figures should include actual costs to sustain a given capability, and may 
include notional cost estimates to sustain a capability through various program standards 
to allow for visibility on cost for a given level of readiness. 
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3. Layers of Management 
The tool can be used by managers at various layers of the incident management 
system recognizing that an overall hierarchy must merge disparate command systems’ 
data supporting the incident.  The system must account for hierarchical administrative, 
operational, and tactical command chains.  Table 3 demonstrates a 7 layer model (with 
sub layers) which identifies key management layers and roles within the incident 
management system.  Such a model provides general visibility on layers of management 
for development of chain of command, hierarchical structure, write/read rights for data 
input, responsibility for veracity of that data, and action requirements within the program 
standards.  Each capability is defined across these layers, as appropriate, with as specific 
as possible definition of the key position or billet with respect to management 
requirements, reporting structure, and write/read rights.  Administrative, operational, or 
tactical command chains are so designated. 
 
Layer Management entity Leader element (DoD equivalent 
title) 
Layer 7 Federal/ General/ Other Secretary (NORTHCOM, OSD, 
COCOM) 
Layer 6 Regional/ State Governor (Service HQ, JRMPO, JTF-
CS) 
Layer 5 Local EOC Mayor (Installation CO) 
Layer 4 Incident Command Post Incident Commander 
Layer 4a Sections Section Chiefs 
Layer 3b Branch Branch Level Managers 
Layer 3a Division/ Group Supervisor 
Layer 2 Unit/ Squad/ Team/ Task 
Force 
Leader 
Layer 1 Single resource First Responder/ Receiver 
Table 3.   Layer Model for Incident Command Structure. 
 
The below Figure demonstrates similar information in wire diagram form.  It 
does not include Layer 1, single resource “first responder/ first receiver”, or Layer 7 at 
the national level. 
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Figure 25.   Wire Diagram (From: M-CAST System) 
 
Common Operating Picture is promoted by providing the necessary visibility at 
the various layers of the hierarchical command system.  Critical data is determined by the 
functions, roles, and responsibilities of various positions within each of the layers.  
Access to data is pre-determined and dashboard views customized for the given layers.  
Figure 26 demonstrates employment of M-CAST across a hierarchical enterprise, 
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 Reliability of communications by either military or civilian personnel is a must.  
The ability to share information between military and civilian entities is very important, 
below is a diagram that shows how the military and civilians would interact in case of 
emergencies.
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
The best business practice call for a workflow representation of action plans for 
crisis management. Using workflows that can adapt schemes for the establishment of 
virtual enterprises to the discovery and integration of appropriate emergency services 
personnel for a given crisis management plan.  
From the research I have accomplished, I would advocate that the New Jersey 
Department of Health and Senior Services look into the DMIS System solution.  As we 
have seen most responders report enclaves or “islands” of good information sharing 
within certain organizations but generally very little capability to share digital 
information among mutual aid partnerships or between civilian and military support 
organizations to include NJDHSS. 
 
 
Figure 28.   Responders Information Problems (Source: DMIS) 
 


























“Grease pencil and 
acetate”  
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 From its inceptions, DMIS solution was to have an interoperability platform and a 
set of basic tools.  The interoperability backbone is one of the most important aspects of 
DMIS.  It is the backbone that allows responders to acquire software that best suits their 
needs without having to worry about their neighbors buying the same software.  The 
backbone enables information sharing among all systems that develop an automated 
program interface to it.  In addition the basic tools provide responders with the basic 
ability to describe an incident and request specific needs. 
In order to leverage technology and gain efficiency DMIS has developed a 




Figure 29.   Horizontal and Vertical Data sharing Flow 
 
 In addition the Emergency Management Technical Committee consists of 
government and commercial members working together to formally develop standards 
facilitating interoperability.  DMIS implements the standards quickly and includes them 
in the published DMIS backbone interface specification.  This provides software 








backbone interface.  A key to reaching higher levels of interoperability maturity is the 
resolution of subtle differences in data definitions among various systems.  Currently, the 
DMIS Backbone and DMIS Tools are used most commonly in Emergency Operations 
Centers at local, mutual aid partner, state, regional, and national levels.  There are a few 
jurisdictions experimenting with the use of DMIS at the Incident Command Post.  Those 
jurisdictions have the resources to 56 KBPS (or faster) wireless data connections “to the 
street.”  From the national viewpoint, DMIS is used in over 1400 operating groups in all 
50 states (DMIS Report). 
 
 
Figure 30.   DMIS Operations (From: DMIS) 
 
DMIS tools will help NJDHSS and Navy Medicine because they provide the 
ability to describe an incident and make specific needs requests in enough detail for 
shared situation awareness with other organizations that may be called upon to help.  
Within the Tactical Information Exchange (TIE) portion of DMIS, there are information 
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forms that are named and look like the acetate-covered information boards in traditional  
 
Emergency Operations Centers.  Locatable incident information (such as the incident site, 
hospitals, shelters, etc.) entered into the TIE forms may be automatically plotted on the 
incident map.   
 The map is central to providing and sharing the “common operating picture” of 
the incident or situation.  Specific Needs Request (SNR) enables listing of needs by local 
responders.  Other organizations can respond to the requests by articulating what assets 
they could provide.   
 The DMIS Messenger is a private online “chat” capability responders can use to 
communicate with other DMIS members real time.  All DMIS Operators who have DMIS 
Messenger running are available to be invited to join a chat session.   
 DMIS Alerts provide the ability to quickly broadcast critical information to DMIS 
Operators in CAP standard format.  Alerts are available as a stand-alone tool in DMIS or 
from within the TIE subsystem.   
 The National Summary Map is used to display incidents with the notification 
level of “National.”  This is a valuable tool for those at higher levels of Government to 
see an overview of incidents in progress around the country. 
 The Weather Forecast tool may be accessed within the TIE subsystem or via the 
Disaster Management Tools menu.  DMIS currently enables users to enter a ZIP code and 
obtain AccuWeather forecast data, in one-hour increments, for the next 48 hours.  The 
user may choose to convert the data for the current hour into a weather observation for a 
working incident record in TIE.  Weather observations may also be entered in the TIE 
Weather Observations form directly 
 In addition there are key principles that characterize DMIS.  DMIS is built “from 
the bottom up” in recognition of the fact that all disasters – no matter how consequential 
or large-scaled – are first encountered by local responders.  DMIS is designed to capture 
the local situation and share it with those with the need to know.  And the map is the 
central means of depicting that situation.  DMIS seeks to “use the data where it lies.”  For 
example, it is easy to use a national data source for aerial photograph layers over maps 
(orthoimages).  But those orthoimages are generally older than those available at state 
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and local level.  DMIS has adopted an open interface standard that will make it relatively 
easy for responders to use more “local” data to locate items on a map. 
 Although NJDHSS is very adamant to use their “own” system; the good news is 
that DMIS allows external systems to use DMIS access control services to make sure that 
only legitimate responders are using the system of systems.  There are several common 
services exposed through the interface that are necessary to manage information 
transactions among the participating external systems.  The DMIS Alert function is also 
freely available, as an option, to external systems who build an interface to the DMIS 
Backbone.  When external systems package an incident report and use the DMIS Post 
function within the interface, a DMIS incident record is automatically generated for 
dissemination via the DMIS backbone.  The Attach function within the interface allows 
external systems to attach files to Alerts and Incident Records for sharing with others via 
the Post function. 
 Hippocrates is obviously to be optimized for the health service domain.  That 
poises it to be a “summary data feeder” to the broader all-hazards incident management 
systems – a very good thing.  I would advocate that NJDHSS employs an open 
interoperability backbone enabling data sharing to all hazards incident management 
systems.  Suggest starting with CAP.  While created for the alerting function, it can also 
be inappropriately but practically used as a general text message among heterogeneous 
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APPENDIX A.  INFECTIOUS DISEASE EMERGENCY PLAN 
A. BASIC PLAN 
This plan is based on the California Infectious Disease Emergency Plan. The 
NJDHSS, New Jersey’, Infectious Disease Emergency Plan (IDEP) should mirror the 
California’s IDEP.  The plan was sent to the New Jersey Department of Senior Services 
but we have not received any feedback as of today.  The project has been temporarily put 
on hold.  This plan should help to assist the NJDHSS and its cities and towns in their 
preparedness activities to respond to an infectious disease emergency, such as an 
influenza pandemic or bioterrorism agent release, in order to minimize morbidity and 
mortality, and maintain health care and other essential community services during periods 
of high absenteeism due to illness. 
This IDEP has been specifically designed to serve as an Annex to their 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) and supplements that document. 
Every effort should be made to integrate the IDEP with the CEMP. In that regard, the 
IDEP is consistent with existing authorities, planning assumptions, systems and 
procedures. 
1. Objectives 
The objectives of the NJDHSS and Infectious Disease Emergency Plan are to: 
1.  Describe courses of action that should minimize morbidity and mortality 
from an outbreak of infectious disease. 
2.  Establish procedures to provide for a coordinated effort among cities and 
towns in response to an infectious disease emergency. 
3.  Identify emergency response organizations, facilities and other resources 
that can be utilized during an outbreak of infectious disease. 
4.  Provide a mechanism to integrate community and facility response 
procedures. 
 
B. ASSUMPTIONS UPON WHICH IDEP IS BASED 
1. Assumptions: Infectious Disease Emergency 
1.  Infectious disease emergencies are inevitable. 
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2.  In the event of an infectious disease emergency, local officials, the 
healthcare community and the general public should look to the local 
health department to coordinate the response. 
3.  There should be widespread circulation of conflicting information, 
misinformation and rumors. Communication must be coordinated among 
all relevant agencies to ensure consistent messages to all entities involved 
in the response and to the general public. 
4.  The infectious disease emergency must take priority until the emergency is 
resolved. 
5.  Even during a minor event, such as a case of hepatitis A in a food handler 
or one case of measles on a college campus, local health departments 
should be responsible for coordinating the distribution and/or 
administration of vaccine and other relevant pharmaceuticals in their 
jurisdiction. 
2. Assumptions: Influenza Pandemic 
1.  An influenza pandemic is inevitable. 
2.  There may be very little warning. Most experts believe that we should 
have between one and six months between the time that a novel influenza 
strain is identified and the time that outbreaks begin to occur in the United 
States. 
3.  Outbreaks may occur simultaneously throughout much of the United 
States, preventing shifts in human and material resources that normally 
occur with other natural localized or regional disasters. 
4.  The effect of an influenza pandemic on individual communities should be 
relatively prolonged -- weeks to months. 
5.  The impact of the next pandemic could have a devastating effect on the 
health and well being of the American public. NJPH estimates that in New 
Jersey alone, during a 2 – 3 month period –  
• Up to 4 million persons should be infected 
• Up to 2 million persons should become clinically ill 
• Up to 1 million persons should require outpatient care 
• Up to 24,000 persons should be hospitalized 
• Up to 6,000 persons should die 
6.  Effective preventive and therapeutic measures -- including vaccines and 
antiviral agents should likely be in short supply, as well as antibiotics to 
treat secondary infections. 
7.  Health-care workers and other first responders should likely be at even 
higher risk of exposure and illness than the general population, further 
impeding the care of victims. 
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8.  Widespread illness in the community should also increase the likelihood 
of sudden and potentially significant shortages of personnel in other 
sectors who provide critical community services, including but not limited 
to, military personnel, police, firefighters, utility workers, and 
transportation workers. 
3. Assumptions: Bioterrorism 
1.  It is very possible, and likely in a national or global sense, an act of 
bioterrorism is imminent in any given location. 
2.  The release of a biological agent should likely go unnoticed until infected 
persons present for medical treatment. 
3.  Most local public health and health care systems should be overwhelmed 
by community requests for information, prophylaxis and treatment when a 
bioterrorist threat or event becomes public knowledge. 
4.  Public health officials should need to work closely with law enforcement 
and other traditional first responders in a bioterrorism event. 
5.  Illnesses resulting from a bioterrorist release may be very difficult to 
differentiate from a naturally occurring outbreak of disease. 
 
C. LOCAL IDEP LEADERSHIP 
The protection of the health and welfare of the residents of New Jersey must be 
managed at the local level. Technical assistance, resources and materiel from the state 
may be provided when requested or in cases where emergency needs exceed the 
capability of local response resources. However, in a very large outbreak of disease, 
many communities should be affected and the state may not be able to meet all requests 
for assistance. With assistance from state agencies, local jurisdictions are responsible 
for: 
1.  Communication of information regarding prevention and control measures 
and local effects of disease. 
2.  Maintenance of public health and essential community functions during 
periods of high absenteeism. 
3.  Vaccine/pharmaceutical management and administration/dispensing. 
 
D. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE 
1. Role of the Local Health Department in Infectious Disease Emergency 
Planning and Response 
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1.  The local health department should assume a leadership role in local 
infectious disease emergency planning and response. It should: 
• Establish provisions for public notification, comments, etc. These 
notification and alerting lists should be reviewed quarterly. 
• Develop and maintain an IDEP in collaboration with other local agencies. 
• Identify resources (personnel, supplies), both available and needed, to 
carry out an emergency immunization/medication dispensing clinic. 
• Assist other departments and agencies with IDEP plan development. 
• Coordinate IDEP exercises as needed. 
• Conduct IDEP training as needed. 
2.  Other local departments and agencies with responsibilities under this plan 
should develop and maintain procedures for implementing an IDEP. These 
procedures should be reviewed at least annually and revised as needed. 
3.  The Commonwealth of New Jersey shall provide assistance to local health 
departments as provided for in the Commonwealth of New Jersey’s 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. 
The local health department should work with the local emergency planning 
committee (LEPC) to develop the IDEP. The New Jersey’s Department of Public Health 
(NJPH) and the New Jersey Emergency Management Agency (NJMA) should be 
available to lend technical assistance for plan development. Items that shall be reviewed 
annually for possible updating include, but are not limited to, the following: 
1.  Community and facility notification and alerting lists, including identity 
and phone numbers of appropriate personnel. 
2.  Lists of priority personnel for receipt of vaccine/pharmaceuticals. 
3.  Inventories of critical equipment, supplies, and other resources. 
In addition, facility and community-specific functions and procedures should be 
reviewed and revised as appropriate. 
 
E. UPDATE POLICY 
The following policies apply to the review and updating of an IDEP. 
1.  It is the responsibility of the chief local health official to coordinate the 
review and update of an IDEP. The departments, agencies, communities, 
facilities, and others who have a role in infectious disease response under 
the plan should provide support. It is the responsibility of the mayor or the 
chief executive of each community to delegate responsibility for updating 
of community information. 
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2.  The plan should be updated as necessary on an annual basis. The plan 
should be completed or reviewed within the past year. 
3.  Departments, agencies and facilities that maintain annexes and/or 
procedures that are a part of this plan should review that portion of the 
plan pertaining to their function on an annual basis. 
4.  The chief local health officer should facilitate and ensure the distribution 
of the updated plan to appropriate entities. 
 
F. DIRECTIONS AND CONTROL 
The purpose of direction and control is to provide for effective leadership, 
coordination and unified response during an infectious disease emergency.  All 
communities have emergency preparedness plans sometimes known as the 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) -- to cope with major disasters 
such as hurricanes, plane crashes and hazardous materials events. These plans address 
many aspects of planning, including command and control functions, descriptions of 
emergency communication systems, hospital and medical care resources, and other key 
response elements that are relevant to infectious disease emergencies. However, 
infectious disease planning should require additional functions that are usually not 
included in the CEMP, such as delivery of vaccines and pharmaceuticals. One of the 
main differences between some infectious disease emergencies and other natural disasters 
is the widespread nature of health effects (along with disruption of critical human 
infrastructure because of those health effects), which require expansion of the typical 
disaster management team. 
1.  Essential Functions for Which Operational Procedures Should Be 
Developed 
The local health department should oversee the development and implementation 
of operational procedures relevant to infectious diseases for the following essential 
functions: 
• Communications  
• Emergency Response  
• Emergency Clinic Management and Operations  
An infectious disease emergency should require a broad range of planning and 
response organizations including local government, public health, medical, emergency 
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response, social service, media and law enforcement. Public health and medical response 
organizations are typically trained to operate within their agency command structure. 
They are rarely called upon to perform their duties as part of a unified and integrated 
multi-organizational response, such as that required for an infectious disease emergency. 
Therefore, this plan calls for implementation of a strong system of direction and control. 
2. Local Agencies and Staff that Should Participate in Infectious Disease 
Emergency Planning and Response 
• Local hospitals or health centers 
• Local public health 
• Emergency medical services 
• Local health care providers (including nursing organizations) 
• Police department 
• Fire department 
• Animal inspectors 
• Animal control officers (ACOs) 
• Veterinarians 
• Public information officer (or designee) 
• School nurse(s) 
• School administrator 
• Representative(s) from the business community 
• Representative(s) from civic and volunteer organizations 
• Local media 
• Social service organizations 
 
G. RESPONSE PROCEDURES 
The NJPH shall be the lead state agency for response to an infectious disease 
emergency. The NJPH should disseminate information regarding an infectious disease 
emergency to the local health department, including information on prevention and 
control. The NJPH also advises the New Jersey’s Emergency Management Agency 
(NJEMA) about directing additional resources to local communities to assist in 
responding to infectious disease emergencies. 
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1. Local Unified Command 
This plan addresses the need to ensure direction and control for a multi-
jurisdiction/multi-agency response to an outbreak of disease. The concept of unified 
command means that all agencies that have jurisdictional responsibilities and authority at 
an incident should contribute to: 
• Determining overall response objectives 
• Selecting response strategies 
• Ensuring joint planning and application of tactical activities 
• Ensuring integrated planning and application of operational requirements 
including emergency measures and vaccine management/pharmaceutical 
distribution 
• Maximizing use of available resources 
• Ensuring dissemination of accurate and consistent information 
2. Role of the Mayor or Chief Elected Official in Infectious Disease 
Emergency Planning and Response 
The chief elected official of the community is responsible for the health and 
safety of the citizens of the community.  Prior to an infectious disease emergency, the 
chief elected official should have appointed a local infectious disease coordinator and a 
public information officer.  During an infectious disease emergency, the chief elected 
official should:  
• Decide whether the local infectious disease coordinator or someone else 
should function as the incident commander during an infectious disease 
emergency. 
• Assess the overall situation including the level of resources needed to deal 
with the problem. 
• Determine who has resources and capacities to share in an infectious 
disease emergency and how these resources can be obtained. 
• Consider the need for a local emergency declaration in consultation with 
the infectious disease coordinator and emergency manager. 
• Be provided with copies of all press releases and summaries of all 
statements provided to the media in live or taped broadcasts. 
• Set up regular situation updates with the infectious disease coordinator. 
• Refer specific questions to the public information officer, but be prepared 
to answer policy related questions in coordination with the incident 
commander. 
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3. Responsibilities for Infectious Disease Emergency Planning and 
Response 
The chief elected official should appoint a local infectious disease coordinator. 
The local infectious disease coordinator may be the director of health or another person. 
The local infectious disease coordinator is responsible for planning and managing an 
infectious disease emergency during the pre-emergency period, during an emerging alert, 
and during the emergency and post emergency periods. 
 
H. COMMUNICATIONS 
The purpose of communications is to ensure an efficient flow of accurate and 
consistent information during an infectious disease emergency, to facilitate 
communication among federal, state and local agencies about disease activity and to 
describe the system for providing information to the general public through the media 
and other information outlets.  Dissemination and sharing of timely and accurate 
information among public health officials, government officials, medical care providers, 
the media and the general public should be one of the most important facets of the 
response. 
1. Assumptions Upon Which the Communications Section of the IDEP is 
Based 
1.  Different types of information should have to be communicated, often to 
different audiences. 
2.  There should be widespread circulation of conflicting information, 
misinformation and rumors. Communication must be coordinated among 
all relevant agencies to ensure consistent messages to the general public. 
3.  There should be a great demand for accurate and timely information 
regarding: 
• How many are ill, who is affected and where they are 
• Basic disease information 
• Disease complications and mortality 
• Disease control efforts, including availability and use of vaccines, 
antivirals and other preventive and treatment measures 
• “Do’s and Don’ts” for the general public 
• Availability of essential community services 
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4.  At the state level, it is possible that a priority list for receipt of 
vaccine/pharmaceuticals should be needed. Depending on existing 
supplies and supplies available through the Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS), there should be a special need for information for the general 
public about availability of vaccine/pharmaceuticals. In the event of 
shortages, the targeted group may have to be further prioritized. 
Information should include the rationale for the list, how decisions were 
made, and what other control measures people can take until vaccine and 
or antibiotics are available for everyone. 
5.  Public education should be an important part of the 
immunization/pharmaceutical campaign because it is likely that the 
following problems should be encountered: 
• Any symptom or illness that closely follows vaccination may be attributed 
to the vaccine and any febrile respiratory illness that occurs post-
vaccination should be viewed as vaccine failure. (ED Kilbourne. National 
Immunization for Pandemic Influenza. Hospital Practice 1976:15-21) 
• Prophylactic antibiotics/antivirals may need to be taken for a period of up 
to 60 days, or longer, and the recipient should need clear instructions on 
how to complete the course of treatment and where to get additional doses 
of antibiotics/antivirals. 
6.  Certain groups should be hard to reach, including people whose primary 
language is not English, people who are homeless, people who are hearing 
and visually impaired, etc... 
7. Local resources, such as community-based organizations, mutual 
assistance or associations, and linguistically and culturally relevant media 
outlets should be identified prospectively. 
8. During a prolonged infectious disease emergency such as influenza 
pandemic or a person to person transmitted BT event, demand for 
information by health care providers should be so great that traditional 
methods for educating health care providers should have to be expanded. 
 
I. LOCAL COMMUNICATION RESPONSE PROCEDURES 
1. Communication Responsibilities of the Local Health Department 
• During an infectious disease emergency, local health department should 
have primary responsibility for: 
• Meeting with the local infectious disease planning coordinator and public 
information officer to review the communication plan. The public 
information officer should monitor the situation and be prepared to 
respond to public and media requests for information. 
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• Setting up a Local Joint Information Center with the public information 
officer to provide and disseminate accurate information to the general 
public. 
• Releasing information through the Local Joint Information Center 
concerning what volunteer goods and services are needed, and where 
volunteers and donors may go to deliver such goods or potential services. 
• Gathering all records kept during all phases of the incident and preparing a 
chronological summary of events, actions taken, inquiries made, and 
response given. 
• Collecting newspaper clippings and TV videotapes, if available. 
• Surveying the local emergency planning committee and the local media 
for suggestions to improve emergency response procedures for future 
emergencies. 
2. Role of the Local Public Information Officer 
All news releases should be handled by the authorized public information officer.  
During an infectious disease emergency, the public information officer should 
have primary responsibility for: 
• Ensuring that all information is clear, confirmed, and approved by 
appropriate authority before release to the media or public. 
• Not releasing unconfirmed information or speculating on the extent of the 
emergency, despite repeated urging by reporters to do so. 
• Monitoring news programs and reviewing news articles for accuracy and 
correcting serious misinformation whenever possible. 
• Establishing a Joint Information Center/Media Center and providing 
sufficient staffing and telephones to handle incoming media and public 
inquiries and gathering information. 
• Providing public information according to priorities. 
• Ensuring that official spokespersons are thoroughly briefed about all 
aspects of the emergency. 
• Keeping the infectious disease planning coordinator informed of all media 
actions taken or planned. 
• Keeping public information officers in other jurisdictions and at other 
government levels informed of information released. 
• Maintaining a log and file of all information. 
• Releasing emergency instructions/information to the public as necessary. 
(Closing of public facilities, where to get vaccine, etc.). 
• Releasing prevention, control and treatment information, as appropriate. 
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• Responding promptly to media and public calls. 
• Releasing public inquiry (“rumor control”) telephone line number when it 
is staffed. 
• Attending periodic briefings and planning sessions. 
• Considering additional methods of distributing emergency instructions. 
• Arranging media briefings/press conferences on a regular or “as needed” 
basis. 
• Preparing news releases, as required. 
• Providing emergency information in foreign languages, as required. 
• Releasing morbidity and mortality figures when obtained. 
3. Communicating with Special Needs Populations/Groups 
As part of infectious disease planning, local health departments should identify 
groups in their communities that should require special efforts to ensure they receive all 
information necessary to protect them during an infectious disease emergency. Outreach 
conducted during the pre-emergency period should ensure that channels are in place to 
facilitate communication during a real emergency. Special needs populations include but 
are not limited to: native people (Native Americans, Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders), 
elderly, children, culturally and/or linguistically distinct communities, deaf and hard of 
hearing, blind and visually impaired, people with disabilities, people that are homebound, 
people that are institutionalized, recent immigrants, migrant/seasonal farm-workers, 
people living with HIV/AIDS (or other immuno-deficient disease), people living with 
mental illnesses, the homeless and others. 
 
J. EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
1. Assumptions Upon Which the Emergency Response Section of the 
IDEP is Based 
Infectious disease emergencies can be broadly grouped into two categories: 
a. Non-Communicable Infectious Disease Emergencies 
The response to non-communicable infectious disease and other biologic 
emergencies is similar to typical local disasters with little or no advance notice. Examples 
of non-communicable events include Bio-Terrorism attacks with anthrax or widespread 
food-borne toxicities, like paralytic shellfish poisoning mediated through a seafood 
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processing plant. Individuals exposed in a non-communicable event should require 
medical triage and evaluation.  However; the spread of the event should be limited 
because of the lack of person to person transmission. Chaos and misinformation should 
be significant problems to contend with. There may be a need for widespread vaccination 
and medication dispensing clinics. 
b. Communicable Infectious Disease Emergencies 
Communicable infectious disease emergencies, such as an influenza 
pandemic or a smallpox outbreak, should be widespread, with many geographic areas 
possibly affected -simultaneously. Thus, each community should have to be prepared to 
act on its own, rather than pooling resources from several contiguous jurisdictions, or 
relying on state personnel for help. Chaos and misinformation should be significant 
problems to contend with. There may be a need for widespread vaccination and 
medication dispensing clinics. 
If illness associated with an infectious disease emergency is especially 
severe, health services could easily become overwhelmed very quickly with the 
following: 
• Shortfalls of ICU beds, ventilators and other critical-care needs 
• Shortages of antibiotics and/or antiviral agents 
• Needs for ancillary or "non-traditional" treatment centers 
• High demand for mortuary/funeral services 
• High demand for social and counseling services 
Unlike natural disasters, demands on medical care in each community 
might be prolonged if the illness spreads from person to person. 
Unlike the typical disaster, essential community service personnel 
themselves (e.g., medical-care personnel, police, firefighters, ambulance drivers and 
other first responders) should be just as likely or even more likely (because of increased 




Because of the threat of exposure to influenza or other infectious diseases, 
the elderly and other high-risk and special-needs populations may be fearful of leaving 
their homes to seek medical attention for chronic medical conditions, and may require 
home visits for basic needs and health care. 
In summary, high attack rates of a communicable disease or the perception 
of personal danger should place overwhelming demands on the health care system. 
Health care providers, emergency response and public safety personnel should be equally 
or more likely to become infected than the general public. Certain high-risk groups 
should be less likely to have access to information and services (e.g., people who are 
homeless, homebound, poor, undocumented or who do not speak English). Because the 
epidemic can be widespread, it is unlikely that resources could be diverted from other 
geographic areas. Every community should have to be prepared to be self-sufficient, 
while at the same time sharing resources such as hospitals, mortuary services, etc. 
 
K. RESPONSE PROCEDURES  
In order to contain the spread of a contagious illness, public health authorities rely 
on many strategies. Two of these strategies are isolation and quarantine. Both are 
common practices in public health and both aim to control exposure to infected or 
potentially infected individuals. Both may be undertaken voluntarily or compelled by 
public health authorities. The two strategies differ in that isolation applies to people who 
are known to have an illness and quarantine applies to those who have been exposed to an 
illness but who may or may not become infected. 
1. Isolation: For People Who are Ill 
Isolation of people who have a specific illness separates them from healthy people 
and restricts their movement to stop the spread of that illness. Isolation allows for focused 
delivery of specialized health care to people who are ill, and it protects healthy people 
from getting sick.  People in isolation may be cared for in their homes, in hospitals, or at 
designated health care facilities. Isolation is a standard procedure used in hospitals today 
for patients with tuberculosis (TB) and other infectious diseases. In most cases, isolation 
is voluntary; however, many levels of government (federal, state, and local) have basic 
authority to compel isolation of sick people to protect the public. 
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2. Quarantine: For People Who Have Been Exposed but are Not Ill 
Quarantine, in contrast, applies to people who have been exposed and may be 
infected but are not yet ill. Separating exposed people and restricting their movements is 
intended to stop the spread of that illness. 
3. Contingency Plans to Meet the Needs of Persons Confined to Their 
Homes 
During an extended or widespread emergency, persons may be confined to their 
homes by choice, out of fear of being exposed and becoming ill, or by direction from 
state or local health officials in order to reduce transmission in the community. 
The provision of food, medical and other essential support for persons confined to 
their homes should be the responsibility of local communities. Local communities are 
encouraged to make use of civic organizations and other volunteers to meet these needs. 
For instance, local agencies already engaged in providing services to the homebound 
(Meals-on-Wheels, etc.) may become the nucleus for voluntary efforts to provide services 
to people confined to their homes.  In addition, there should likely be situations in which 
care providers of children, people with special needs or the elderly should become ill and 
unable to care for their dependents.  Communities should need to have plans in place to 
identify these situations (e.g., hotlines and or home visiting programs) and contingency 
plans to care for these individuals. Resources to staff hotlines or home visiting programs 
include civic/volunteer organizations, local colleges and senior citizens. Using these 
resources on a regular basis to staff flu clinics, health fairs, etc. should ensure a ready 
group of volunteers in an infectious disease emergency. 
4. Medical Care for People Sick at Home 
Families should need information about how to take care of sick family members 
at home, and guidelines regarding when to seek professional medical care. This first-line 
triage should be essential to eliminating unnecessary calls and decreasing the burden on 
health care providers, freeing them to care for the seriously ill. 
5. Maintenance of Other Essential Community Services 
Personnel, who provide essential community services, including public safety and 
emergency response, should be as likely to become ill during an infectious disease 
emergency as the general public. Contingency plans for back up for essential personnel 
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during periods of high absenteeism need to be in place to ensure continuation of essential 
community services during the pandemic.  Each local agency should review and update 
(or develop) lists of essential services and personnel. Contingency plans should be 
developed to provide backup for any personnel whose absence would pose a threat to 
public safety or would significantly interfere with the on-going response to the pandemic. 
Backup personnel could come from reassignment of personnel from non-essential 
programs within local agencies, retired personnel and/or private-sector personnel with 



























APPENDIX B.  BIOTERRORISM SURVEILLANCE AND 
EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESPONSE PLAN 
The New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services (NJDHSS) has also 
requested NPS to provide them with a Bioterrorism Surveillance and Epidemiologic 
Response Plan that should be the product of collaborative efforts involving public health 
partners at the local, state, and federal levels.  This response plan again is based on the 
California’s Health and Human Services Response plan. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Bioterrorism and its potential for mass destruction have been subjects of 
increasing concern. Terrorist groups have used or threatened to use biological agents in a 
variety of circumstances, both domestically and internationally. Current concerns 
regarding the threat of bioterrorism result from the production of biological weapons for 
use in the 1991 Gulf War and from the increasing number of countries that are engaged in 
the proliferation of such weapons. As many as ten countries possess offensive biological 
weapons programs and the existence of these programs increases the likelihood that 
biological expertise should be transferred, directly or indirectly, to groups and individuals 
with grievances against the government or society. 
The growth of religious cults and extremist political groups also increases the 
threat of bioterrorism - today. New Jersey is vulnerable to bioterrorist incidents. New 
Jersey consists of a population of 8,698,879 and is a large economy that continues to be a 
major port of entry for travelers to the U.S.  The public health infrastructure at the local 
and state levels must be prepared to detect, control, and prevent illness and injury 
resulting from biological and chemical terrorism, especially a covert terrorist attack. 
Preparation for bioterrorism involves strengthening of the existing infrastructure for the 
surveillance of infectious diseases; detection, and investigation of outbreaks; 
identification of etiologic agents and their modes of transmission; the development of 
prevention and control strategies; and; the mobilization and management of resources 
required to respond to disease outbreaks and other health emergencies. 
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The following section of this plan addresses surveillance and epidemiologic 
response. The overall NJDHSS plan should include sections on bioterrorism 
preparedness; surveillance and epidemiologic response; the laboratory’s role in 
bioterrorism detection and response; health and medical response; and, communication.  
The plan should be compliant with the Standardized Emergency Management System for 
the request and activation of resources. This plan is a working document that should be 
updated to reflect new developments and lessons learned in bioterrorism preparedness 
and response. 
 
B. SURVEILLANCE AND EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESPONSE SECTION 
Early detection of bioterrorist events is essential because; although, most diseases 
caused by bioterrorist threat agents are rapidly fatal, many are readily treatable and/or 
preventable with timely administration of appropriate antibiotics, antiserum, vaccination, 
and/or prophylaxis following exposure. If the bioterrorist event involves a disease that is 
transmissible from person-to-person, early detection would also allow timely 
implementation of isolation and/or quarantine guidelines to prevent additional cases. 
A coordinated epidemiologic investigation must be conducted as soon as a 
suspected bioterrorist event is detected to determine the etiology and source of the 
outbreak and to identify the most effective interventions to save as many lives as 
possible.  The objectives of this bioterrorism surveillance and epidemiologic response 
section are: 
1. To describe how NJDHSS plans to enhance surveillance and 
epidemiologic response for suspected bioterrorist event(s); 
2. To define roles and relationships between local health departments and 
NJDHSS partners in bioterrorist surveillance and epidemiologic response 
activities; and 
3. To provide guidance to local health departments regarding bioterrorism 
surveillance and response strategies at the local level. 
 
C. BIOTERRORIST EVENT DEFINITIONS 
For the earliest recognition of bioterrorism, public health personnel who conduct 
traditional disease investigations must become familiar with unusual disease events that 
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should increase the index of suspicion for bioterrorism. To help facilitate this early 
recognition among local public health officials, this section of the bioterrorism 
surveillance and epidemiology document attempts to define disease scenarios that may 
represent the initial report of a bioterrorist event. 
The bioterrorist threat agents deemed the highest priority by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) are the causes of: anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), 
botulism (Clostridium botulinum), plague (Yersinia pestis), smallpox (variola major), 
tularemia (Francisella tularensis), and viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses and arena 
viruses).  
These agents are prioritized by the CDC based on their potential ease of 
dissemination, ability to cause high mortality, the need for special preparations such as 
vaccine development or antibiotic stockpiles and finally, the social disruption they could 
cause. With the exceptions of smallpox (the endemic transmission of which has been 
globally eradicated) and filoviruses, human diseases caused by these threat agents do 
occur in New Jersey, albeit rarely. NJDHSS’ Division of Communicable Disease Control 
(DCDC) staff is available 24 hours a day to assist local health departments in determining 
whether an unusual illness or cluster of illnesses should be considered suspicious for 
bioterrorism.  
1. Highly Suggestive of Bioterrorism 
A single definitively diagnosed or strongly suspected case of: 
• Smallpox 
• Inhalational anthrax 
• Coetaneous anthrax (with no known risk factors compatible with 
naturally-occurring disease) 
• Viral hemorrhagic fever (in a patient with no international travel history) 
OR 
• Greater than one case of: 
• Pneumonic plague 
• Pneumonic tularemia with at least one laboratory confirmed case, no 





• A higher than expected number of unexplained deaths occurring in a brief 
time period within a defined geographic region. 
2. Moderately Suggestive of Bioterrorism 
A single definitively diagnosed or strongly suspected case of: 
• Pneumonic plague 
• Pneumonic tularemia occurring in a patient with no known compatible risk 
factors 
OR 
• A cluster of brucellosis cases occurring in persons with no known 
compatible risk factors 
OR 
• A higher than expected number of presumptively diagnosed botulism 
cases with no known compatible risk factors occurring in a brief time 
period 
OR 
• A higher than expected number of cases of unexplained severe respiratory 
illness requiring hospitalization, especially if occurring outside the usual 
flu transmission season 
OR 
• The occurrence of any unusual epidemiologic features in a seemingly 
natural outbreak 
• (e.g., the absence of the usual risk factors for disease, or the presence of 
unusual risk factors, or greater than expected morbidity or mortality). 
•  
D. CONFIRMATION 
Confirmation that a bioterrorism event definition has been met may require 
consultation among local, state, and/or federal public health officials. NJDHSS disease 
experts, including laboratorians, stand ready to assist local public health officials in 
assessing the clinical, laboratory, and epidemiologic features of a disease event, to 
determine whether the disease scenario is suspicious for bioterrorism. The disease-
specific investigation algorithms may be useful in helping to determine whether 




E. NOTIFICATION OF SUSPECTED/CONFIRMED BIOTERRORIST 
EVENTS 
Once local, state and/or federal public health officials confirm that a disease 
scenario meets the event definition for bioterrorism, local, state, and federal bioterrorism 
response partners should be notified immediately.  At the local level, the health 
department (LHD) is responsible for contacting their local Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) office. FBI is the lead law enforcement agency for crisis management 
of a bioterrorist event.  The State should be notified by the LHD through two major 
notification routes. The LHD should contact the Governor’s Office of Emergency 
Services (OES) and should notify the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior 
Services (NJDHSS) directly by contacting the Division of Communicable Disease 
Control’s Duty Officer of the Day (DCDC DOD) or a DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contact. 
The DCDC DOD (assumption) is on-call 24 hours a day and is responsible for 
responding to all calls involving infectious disease emergencies.  When the LHD contacts 
the state through the OES, the LHD should call the OES Warning Control Center. The 
OES Warning Control Center receives warnings and notifications of all disasters in New 
Jersey, including acts of bioterrorism, and is responsible for notifying all appropriate 
local, state, and federal agencies. In the event of bioterrorism, the OES should notify 
NJDHSS Duty Officer (NJDHSS DO). The NJDHSS DO triages calls regarding public 
health emergencies. The NJDHSS DO receiving a call involving a suspected bioterrorist 
event should notify the NJDHSS Emergency Preparedness Office (NJDHSS EPO) 
Counterterrorism Coordinator and the DCDC DOD or a DCDC Bioterrorism Key 
Contact. 
Within DCDC, four Bioterrorism Key Contacts have been identified: the State 
Epidemiologist, the Bioterrorism Surveillance and Epidemiologic Response Team 
(BSERT) Leader, the Viral and Rickettsial Disease Laboratory (VRDL) Chief, and the 
Microbial Diseases Laboratory (MDL) Chief. Only one Key Contact is required to be 
contacted, but they should be called IN SEQUENCAL ORDER until one is successfully 
reached (i.e., if the State Epidemiologist cannot be contacted, the BSERT Leader should 
be called next). 
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When the LHD calls the DCDC directly, they may call either the DCDC DOD or 
a DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contact. If the DCDC DOD is the first to be notified by the 
LHD, the DCDC DOD should call the NJDHSS DO. The DCDC DOD should also call 
the four DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contacts IN SEQUENCAL ORDER until one is 
reached. 
The first DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contact to be reached is responsible for 
ensuring the notification of all members of the DCDC Bioterrorism Working Group: 
DCDC Chief, Disease Investigations and Surveillance Branch (DISB) Chief, Disease 
Investigations Section (DIS) Chief, Veterinary Public Health Section (VPHS) Chief, 
Vector Borne Diseases Section (VBDS) Chief, Surveillance and Statistics Section (SSS) 
Chief, BSERT Leader, VRDL Chief, and MDL Chief.  If a member of the Working 
Group cannot be contacted, his or her designated alternate should be contacted. If the 
DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contact is the first to be notified by the LHD, the DCDC 
Bioterrorism Key Contact should also notify the DCDC DOD and the NJDHSS DO. The 
Key Contact is also responsible for verifying that the local FBI office has already been 
contacted and, if not, to notify it of the situation. 
When the NJDHSS DO first learns of a bioterrorist event through DCDC (either 
the DCDC DOD or a DCDC Bioterrorism Key Contact), he or she should notify the OES 
Warning Control Center and the NJDHSS EPO Counterterrorism Coordinator. The EPO 
Counterterrorism Coordinator should call the DCDC DOD or the DCDC Bioterrorism 
Key Contact to coordinate communications with the DCDC Bioterrorism Working 
Group. 
Once the DCDC Bioterrorism Working Group is notified, the Working Group 
should contact the Health Officers of the appropriate LHDs. The Health Officers are then 
responsible for the notification of the appropriate personnel in their jurisdictions.  The 
Working Group should also notify the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program 
(BPRP) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
1. Notification  
As previously mentioned we are following the California’s Emergency Response, 











F. SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS FOR DETECTING BIOTERRORIST 
EVENTS 
1. Introduction 
a. Essential Role of Surveillance 
An act of terrorism involving the release of a biological agent is a major 
public health emergency and requires immediate response. In contrast to other emergency 
events, an attack with a biological agent should probably not be detected at the time the 
event occurs, nor should it elicit an immediate response from police, fire or emergency 
medical services personnel. This is because an attack with a biological agent is likely to 
be covert and also because there is a delay between exposure and the onset of symptoms 
(incubation period) which can be as long as several days, weeks or even months. 
The difficulty of early detection is further compounded because diseases 
caused by many of the likely bioterrorist agents may not be accurately diagnosed until 
late in their course, since early symptoms tend to be nonspecific.  Finally, most clinicians 
in the United States have little or no experience with these agents (e.g., inhalational 
anthrax or smallpox). 
Early detection of bioterrorist events is essential because although most 
bioterrorist threat diseases1 are rapidly fatal and some are easily transmitted from person-
to-person, many bioterrorist threat diseases are readily treatable and/or preventable if 
patients are provided timely and proper antibiotics, antiserum and/or immunization 
following exposure.   Conversely, bioterrorist threat diseases may prove fatal if therapy 
or prophylaxis is delayed until classic symptoms develop.  Early detection and rapid 
investigation by public health epidemiologists is critical for determining the scope and 
magnitude of the exposure. Delays in detection and/or epidemiologic investigation may 
result in illness and deaths. 
b. Roles and Responsibilities of NJDHSS 
The roles and responsibilities of NJDHSS in bioterrorism surveillance 
include: 
1. Supporting local health departments to increase awareness of clinicians 
and laboratorians about bioterrorist threat agents and diseases  
2. Strengthening existing disease surveillance systems 
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3. Utilizing and/or developing additional surveillance systems which might 
be useful in detecting illness resulting from bioterrorist threat agents  
4.  Providing technical assistance to local health jurisdictions implementing 
pilot surveillance systems for detecting bioterrorist events  
5.  Coordinating expanded surveillance in the affected jurisdictions1 in the 
event of a suspected bioterrorist event or other biologic disaster. Specific 
NJDHSS activities to enhance bioterrorism surveillance include: 
• The revision of state disease reporting regulations to make all suspected 
and confirmed cases of bioterrorist threat diseases immediately reportable. 
• The implementation of a rapid electronic laboratory disease reporting and 
alert system. 
• The development of tools for increasing awareness about bioterrorism 
(e.g., slide sets, fact sheets, training curricula). 
• The implementation of informal intra- and inter-departmental notification 
of unusual health events detected by existing surveillance systems (e.g., 
veterinary surveillance, botulinum antitoxin requests, influenza 
surveillance project). 
• The provision of technical assistance to local health departments piloting 
systems or mechanisms that could be useful in the detection of bioterrorist 
events including surrogate measure monitoring (e.g., hospital admission 
diagnoses; 911 calls) and clinical syndrome reporting. 
c. Roles and Responsibilities of Local Health Departments 
The local health department has the lead role in the early detection and 
identification of a bioterrorist event. And, in the event of a confirmed bioterrorist event or 
other large biologic disaster, the local health department should be responsible for 
initiating expanded surveillance.  At a minimum, local health departments should 
implement activities to educate clinicians and laboratorians about: 
• Their disease reporting responsibilities, especially of outbreaks and 
unusual disease occurrences. 
• Bioterrorist threat agents and diseases, and 
• How to contact the local health department in case of a public health 
emergency. 
 
                                                 
1 The bioterrorist threat agents deemed the highest priority by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) are the causes of: anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), botulism (Clostridium botulinum), plague 
(Yersinia pestis), smallpox (variola major), tularemia (Francisella tularensis), and viral hemorrhagic fevers 
(filoviruses and arena viruses). (See Appendix A for complete list of CDC high-priority diseases). 
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Local health departments could also establish and/or strengthen informal 
disease reporting links with other partners (e.g., animal control, veterinarians, medical 
examiners and coroners, infection control practitioners, poison control centers, quarantine 
personnel). 
If resources are available, local health departments may opt to implement 
pilot surveillance projects for improving the early detection of bioterrorist threat diseases 
and infectious disease outbreaks.  The following section of the NJDHSS bioterrorism 
surveillance and epidemiology plan includes an overview of activities which the state 
plans to implement to improve surveillance for bioterrorist events and a description of 
additional activities, which could be considered at the state or local health department 
level if resources are available. 
2. Overview of Strategies for Improving Bioterrorism Surveillance 
Existing disease reporting systems in California are neither sensitive nor timely 
enough to allow a rapid response to a bioterrorist event. Current estimates are that only 
about 20% of some reportable diseases are actually reported in some NJ counties2. 
Physicians are not fully meeting their legally mandated requirements to report 
communicable disease occurrences because of lack of knowledge, time, interest, and the 
current cumbersome (paper-based) reporting process.  Early detection of bioterrorist 
events may be achieved through a spectrum of activities. At one end of the spectrum are 
detection systems that are more specific but less timely, which include mandatory 
reporting of diseases and conditions by health care professionals and laboratories. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum are detection systems that are more sensitive and timely, but 
less specific. For example, emergency medical services systems could collect sensitive 
and timely data on hospital diversion hours or 911 calls, but follow-up investigation is 
needed to determine whether an increase in diversions or calls is due to an unusual health 
event.  Strategies for strengthening the early detection of bioterrorist events may be 
grouped into the following categories: 
• Increasing awareness of clinicians and laboratorians 
• Strengthening the communicable disease reporting system 
                                                 
2 System Requirements and Feasibility Analysis for Communicable Disease Reporting via the Internet 
in California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report sponsored by CDHS (October 1998). 
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• Utilizing additional surveillance systems 
• Piloting novel detection systems 
3. Increasing Awareness of Clinicians and Laboratorians 
Early detection depends upon healthcare provider and laboratorian recognition and 
reporting of suspicious illnesses and organisms. Increasing the awareness of clinicians 
and laboratorians about bioterrorist threat agents and diseases is an important strategy for 
improving bioterrorism surveillance.  Some strategies and tools that NJDHSS and local 
health departments could use to increase awareness about bioterrorism are listed below. 
a. Strategies for Increasing Awareness about Bioterrorism 
Education of clinicians and laboratorians about their essential roles in 
recognizing and reporting a possible bioterrorist event and/or other infectious disease 
outbreak(s) could be achieved in a variety of settings. Presentations could be given at 
clinical rounds at local hospitals and at meetings of local professional organizations, 
targeting specialists in internal medicine, emergency medicine, pediatrics, family 
practice, infectious diseases, critical care, pulmonary medicine, and pathology. Other 
target audiences include pre-hospital care providers, infection control practitioners, 
physician-trainees and medical students, medical examiners, veterinarians, and 
microbiologists. Training seminars are being given to public health laboratory personnel, 
health maintenance organization (HMO) laboratory personnel and other hospital 
laboratory personnel throughout New Jersey. 
Bulletins on bioterrorism and fact sheets on the bioterrorist threat agents 
could be widely distributed to the medical and laboratory communities via the internet 
and via traditional means (mailing).  Posters that list the notifiable diseases and remind 
health providers (emergency departments, intensive care, etc.) of their reporting 
obligations could also be printed and distributed. All of these activities provide an 
excellent opportunity for reinforcing surveillance and reporting in general. 
b. Tools for Increasing Awareness about Bioterrorism 
Training curricula, disease fact sheets, and other tools for increasing 




departments for use at the local level. Additional training materials are being developed 
for public health professionals and laboratorians including laboratory bench training and 
distance learning modules. 
 
G. STRENGTHENING THE COMMUNICABLE DISEASE REPORTING 
SYSTEM 
Approaches to strengthening the existing disease reporting system include: 
1)  Revision of disease reporting regulations to make all suspected and 
confirmed cases of bioterrorist threat diseases immediately reportable by 
health care providers and laboratories  
2)  Implementation of a rapid electronic laboratory disease alert and reporting 
system. 
1. Reporting Regulations 
Immediate reporting of all bioterrorist threat diseases is critical for limiting the 
impact of the bioterrorist event. Emergency amendments3 to the New Jersey Code of 
Regulations (Title 17), effective as of November 5, 2001, made those diseases that pose a 
significant threat as agents of biological terrorism immediately reportable by health care 
providers4 to the local health department (LHD); by the LHD to the NJDHSS; and by 
clinical laboratories, public health laboratories, and veterinary laboratories to the LHD. 
The current status of the emergency regulations require health care providers to 
immediately report by telephone all suspected and confirmed cases of bioterrorist threat 
diseases, which include anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, plague (animal or human), 
smallpox (variola), tularemia, varicella (deaths only), viral hemorrhagic fevers, unusual 
diseases5, and outbreaks of any disease to the local health department. In addition, the 
emergency regulations also require local health officers to immediately report to 
NJDHSS by telephone upon being notified of suspected or confirmed cases of the 
bioterrorist threat diseases listed above. 
                                                 
3 The emergency amendments to the New Jersey Code of Regulations (Title 17) are available on the 
Internet at http://www.dhs.nj.gov/regulation. 
4 Health care providers include physicians, surgeons, veterinarians, podiatrists, physician assistants, 
registered nurses, nurse midwives, school nurses, infection control practitioners, medical examiners, 
coroners and dentists. 
5 ‘Unusual disease’ means a rare disease or a newly apparent or emerging disease or syndrome of 
uncertain etiology that a health care provider has reason to believe could possibly be caused by a 
transmissible infectious agent or by a microbial toxin 
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The emergency regulation amendments also expand reporting responsibilities of 
clinical laboratories, approved public health laboratories, and veterinary laboratories. In 
addition to the 18 communicable diseases that were already reportable to the local health 
department within 24 hours of providing results to the physician, the newly adopted 
emergency regulations require laboratories to report laboratory findings indicative of the 
specified bioterrorist threat agent to the local health department within one hour of 
providing results to the physician.   
2. Electronic Laboratory Reporting 
Monitoring electronic reports of requests for laboratory tests and laboratory test 
results could provide the earliest recognition of a bioterrorist incident. 
 
H. UTILIZING ADDITIONAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS FOR 
DETECTING ILLNESS RESULTING FROM BIOTERRORIST THREAT 
AGENTS 
The integration of information from other surveillance systems into the routine 
communicable disease reporting system could facilitate the early detection of a 
bioterrorist event. Existing surveillance systems that are currently being integrated to 
facilitate bioterrorism surveillance are described in Section A of Appendix F and include 
veterinary surveillance, botulism surveillance, and influenza surveillance Project. 
 
I. PILOTING NOVEL DETECTION METHODS SUCH AS SURROGATE 
MEASURE MONITORING AND CLINICAL SYNDROME REPORTING 
Where resources are available, local health departments are developing systems 
for detecting and responding to non-specific increases in surrogate markers (e.g., 
absenteeism, emergency department presenting complaints, emergency department 
diversions) and increases in numbers of patients seeking care for specific clinical 
syndromes. NJDHSS should endeavor to provide technical assistance when requested and 
should monitor the progress of pilot projects. 
1. Surrogate Indicator Monitoring 
Indirect or surrogate indicators may be useful for monitoring the presence of 
abnormal levels of disease, as well as for detecting a bioterrorist event. Systems for 
monitoring surrogate indicator data should require the development of algorithms and 
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statistical methods for detecting unusual or suspicious events. Although surrogate 
measure data have the potential of being timely and sensitive, they are not specific. 
Unusual findings necessitate follow-up by the local public health department requiring 
significant resources. 
Potential data sources include: 
• 911 dispatch 
• Emergency department diversions 
• Emergency department visits or diagnoses 
• Nurse advice call centers 
• Poison control centers 
• Over-the-counter pharmacy sales 
• Medical examiner/vital statistics 
• Hospital admissions/diagnoses 
• Critical care unit admissions/diagnoses 
• Absenteeism in schools/large worksites 
2. Clinical Syndrome Reporting 
Clinical syndrome surveillance, the reporting of clinical syndromes rather than 
specific diagnoses and/or laboratory-confirmed cases, has the potential for facilitating the 
early detection of a bioterrorist event.  Clinical syndrome surveillance can be extremely 
resource-intensive since it requires the establishment of new infrastructure for collecting, 
reporting, and responding to data.  
 
J. EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESPONSE TO SUSPECTED/CONFIRMED 
BIOTERRORIST EVENTS 
Although the steps in the epidemiologic response to a suspected bioterrorist event 
should be similar to other communicable disease outbreaks, the tempo should be much 
faster. These steps are listed below in order; however, many should be conducted 
simultaneously, and the importance of a particular step may vary depending on the 





The first step in the epidemiologic response to a disease scenario suspicious for 
bioterrorism should be to reach a consensus that bioterrorism is moderately or strongly 
suspected, whether for a single case or for a cluster of cases (See Event Definitions, 
Section II). Local, state, and federal disease experts should help determine whether the 
clinical and/or laboratory findings are consistent with a bioterrorist threat agent and/or 
whether the epidemiologic evidence supports the suspicion of bioterrorism. 
The NJDHSS Microbial Diseases Laboratory (MDL) or the Viral and Rickettsial 
Disease Laboratory (VRDL) should be involved in confirming the causative agent in a 
potential bioterrorist event (See Laboratory Section of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Plan). However, in the case of diseases for which prompt laboratory diagnosis 
is not possible (e.g., smallpox), specimens should be forwarded to a national reference 
laboratory for laboratory confirmation, and clinical and other criteria should necessarily 
be relied upon to determine whether a disease scenario meets the event definition for 
bioterrorism. 
2. Notification 
Once it is agreed that the disease scenario meets the event definition for 
bioterrorism, local, state, and federal bioterrorism response partners should be 
immediately notified. The NJDHSS Bioterrorism Surveillance and Epidemiologic 
Response Team (BSERT) should be activated and should serve as the state’s core 
epidemiologic rapid response team. 
3. Coordination 
New Jersey’s epidemiologic response to a bioterrorist event should be coordinated 
by the NJDHSS/DCDC in the event of a multi-jurisdictional infectious disease outbreak. 
Local, state, and federal public health leaders should participate in the epidemiologic 
investigation under a joint command structure and the lead for the investigation should be 
determined through the joint command. In the event of a bioterrorist outbreak involving a 
single health jurisdiction, the NJDHSS/DCDC should be available to provide 
epidemiologic support if requested. 
Several types of personnel may be required for the epidemiologic investigation 
including: interviewers, environmental health inspectors, disease control investigators, 
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epidemiologists, data entry staff, and data managers. Personnel should be drawn from 
affected and from unaffected local health departments and from NJDHSS/DCDC. 
Finally, federal epidemiologic assistance can be requested from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC).  The epidemiologic investigation should be coordinated 
with the criminal investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
the lead agency in the crisis management of a bioterrorist event. 
4. Communication 
Information from the outbreak investigation should be communicated to other 
New Jersey bioterrorism response partners such as the Office of Emergency Services 
(OES) and the Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA) to help guide planning 
for distribution of medical resources, and to the FBI.  In the event of an outbreak 
involving multiple health jurisdictions, release of public information regarding the 
epidemiologic investigation and response should be coordinated by the local health 
department public health information officers and the NJDHSS Office of Public Affairs 
(OPA) with the FBI to assure accurate and consistent public health messages (see 
Medical Response and Media Sections of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Plan). 
Messages may include information about the disease and its prevention, treatment 
and control, and the progress of the outbreak investigation. If the disease is thought to be 
transmissible from person-to-person, requests for locating contacts could be 
communicated through the media. Recommendations for treatment of cases and contacts 
should also be communicated directly to medical care providers by those coordinating the 
medical response (see Medical Response Section of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Plan). Treatment and prophylaxis guidelines, infection control guidelines, and 
disease fact sheets should be included in the Medical Response Section of the 
Bioterrorism Plan. 
5. Epidemiologic Investigation 
In a multi-jurisdictional bioterrorist event, local, state, and federal public health 
leaders should participate in the epidemiologic investigation under a joint command 
structure. The lead for the epidemiologic investigation should be determined through the  
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joint command. In the event of a bioterrorist outbreak involving a single health 
jurisdiction, the NJDHSS/DCDC should be available to provide epidemiologic support if 
requested. 
 
K. HYPOTHESIS-GENERATING INTERVIEWS 
Hypothesis-generating interviews with the initial cases should be conducted as 
early as possible in the epidemiologic investigation to help identify the causal agent and 
possible modes and locations of exposure. If the specific etiologic agent for the illness 
has not been identified, investigators should need to ask a broad array of exploratory 
clinical and exposure questions to better characterize the disease outbreak. However, if 
the causal agent (or agents) has been identified, questionnaires with disease-specific 
clinical questions combined with exploratory exposure questions should be more 
appropriate. Template syndromic and disease-specific questionnaires have been 
developed for this purpose. Exploratory and in-depth risk exposure questions have been 
developed to assess various potential modes of exposure and have been included in both 
the syndromic and disease-specific questionnaires. 
Regardless of whether the syndromic or the disease-specific questionnaires are 
used in hypothesis-generating interviews, the template questionnaires should have to be 
modified at the time of the event to reflect or incorporate available information and 
hypotheses. Information from the initial cases should be used to construct an 
epidemiologic curve, demographic and clinical profiles, and to determine possible 
sources of exposure. 
1.  Case Definition 
Using the data from the initial hypothesis-generating interviews, a working case 
definition should be established. A uniform case definition should be used to identify 
additional cases requiring follow-up and to provide a meaningful case count across 
jurisdictions. 
2.  Case Finding 
Case finding should be conducted by local and state public health officials 
through alerts to multiple potential reporting sources, including: 
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• Public health officials and personnel 
• Public health and clinical laboratories 
• Hospitals, physicians, and infection control practitioners 
• Emergency medical services 
• Media 
Public health alerts could recommend that persons with symptoms promptly seek 
health care. If the source of initial exposure is known, the alerts could also recommend 
that persons who believe that they have been exposed should telephone the local health 
department for further instructions. 
Hotlines could be established at the local health department to receive calls from 
clinicians and the public about potential cases and contacts.   
3.  Case Interviews 
Cases should be interviewed using a uniform questionnaire. A pre-prepared 
template questionnaire using information generated from the hypothesis-generating 
interviews, to further characterize the mode or source of the exposure.  
In a multi-jurisdictional event, interviews should be conducted by local and state 
public health personnel. 
4.  Data Analysis 
Data entry and analysis for epidemiologic investigation and contact tracing 
activities should be coordinated by NJDHSS/DCDC when a bioterrorist event involves 
multiple health jurisdictions. If a bioterrorist event involves a single health jurisdiction, 
the NJDHSS/DCDC should be available to provide data analysis support to the local 
health department. The primary objective of data analysis should be to provide timely, 
comprehensive data for public health and public safety decision-makers to formulate 
control measures to mitigate the public health impact of the event. The outbreak 
investigation monitoring tool can help facilitate data management and analysis activities 
throughout the investigation.  Epidemiologists should analyze data collected from case 
interviews to determine: 
• The magnitude and distribution of the outbreak 
• Time, location, and mode of exposure 
• Demographics of affected persons 
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• Vehicle(s) of exposure 
• Persons at risk for disease (from either initial exposure or secondarily 
through contact with a case) who should need treatment, prophylaxis, and 
medical follow-up. 
 
L. CONTACT TRACING 
If the disease is transmissible from person-to-person, those responsible for contact 
management should endeavor to interview possible contacts identified by cases and those 
identified through other means (e.g., hotline) to confirm their contact status. All clinical 
and epidemiologic information should be entered into a database for analysis.  
All persons identified as contacts should be referred for vaccination, prophylaxis, 
isolation and/or quarantine as appropriate and should be kept under active surveillance 
(temperature checks twice a day) by those responsible for contact management. Contacts 
that develop fever should be advised to seek medical attention immediately. 
Contact management forms have been developed for plague, smallpox, and viral 
hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) to help facilitate the management of data from all contacts 
under surveillance. 




Table 4.   Epidemiologic Table (From: California DHS) 
 
M. LABORATORIES 
Epidemiologic response personnel should refer questions regarding specimen 
collection, packaging, storage, and shipment to the appropriate point of contact at the 
local public health laboratory. 
 
N. EXPANDED SURVEILLANCE FOR NON-HUMAN POPULATIONS 
If the disease outbreak is thought to involve animals, public health officials from 
the 
Vector-Borne Diseases Section (VBDS) and Veterinary Public Health Section 
(VPHS) should coordinate enhanced vector and veterinary surveillance as necessary.  The 
ability of an aerosolized release of a vector-borne bioterrorist agent targeted against 
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humans to subsequently affect reservoir populations depends on many factors (e.g., 
specific location indoors or outdoors, geographical location – urban or rural, presence of 
competent reservoir and vector populations, climatic factors, season, etc.). The actual 
likelihood of such an occurrence would presumably be low. However, if location and 
environmental factors were conducive to exposing competent reservoir populations to the 
bioterrorist agent, it would be prudent to establish surveillance and possible vector 
control activities. 
After an aerosolized release of a vector-borne bioterrorist agent, VBDS could 
conduct a risk assessment to determine the risk of subsequent vector-borne transmission 
(by measuring the local vector/reservoir densities and their competencies. This could be 
very useful for those involved in the managing the bioterrorist event response.  Domestic 
and wildlife populations may experience morbidity and mortality due to bioterrorist 
agents. If animals are affected in a bioterrorist attack, VPHS should coordinate with New 
Jersey  Department of Food and Agriculture (NJDFA), the New Jersey Department of 
Fish and Game (NJDFG), and veterinary practitioners to monitor susceptible animal 
populations and to implement appropriate control measures (e.g., quarantine, treatment, 
and vaccination) to prevent spread of the disease within animal populations. 
 
O. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION 
Experts have compiled consensus treatment and post-exposure prophylaxis 
guidelines for the top-threat bioterrorist agents. However, in addition to the consensus 
treatment guidelines, results from analyses of outbreak-specific epidemiologic data 
should be used to identify the exposed population(s), priority groups for prophylaxis, and 
the appropriate strategies for quarantine and isolation. This information should be 
provided to those responsible for coordinating the medical response.  The Medical 
Response Section of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Plan should also 
contain guidelines and recommendations for disease prevention and control measures, 
including: 
• Treatment of cases 
• Prophylactic treatment of exposed persons 
• Isolation of cases and quarantine of exposed persons, if necessary 
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• Use of personal protective equipment (PPE) 
• Implementation of infection control practices 
• Appropriate handling of the vehicle or source, if necessary 
 
P. OVERT OR ANNOUNCED BIOTERRORIST THREAT 
The epidemiologic response to an overt or announced bioterrorism event shall be guided 
by the FBI and law enforcement assessment of the credibility of the threat. If the FBI 
believes the threat to be credible and has obtained information about the time, place, 
mode, and/or contents of the release, this information should be made available by the 
FBI to public health personnel as soon as possible so that public health can: 
• define the population at risk for exposure to the biological agent; 
• locate the persons at risk for exposure as soon as possible to assess them 
for illness and provide appropriate preventive treatment; 
• monitor the persons who have received preventive treatment for symptoms 
or signs of disease; and implement enhanced surveillance for the suspected 
disease at health care facilities, laboratories, and emergency medical 
services.   
Active surveillance for diseases caused by other potential bioterrorist threat agents 
should also be conducted, as multiple biological agents may have been released at the 
same time or serially.   
Notification of public health and medical personnel and any release of public 
information shall be coordinated with the FBI. The epidemiologic investigation shall be 
coordinated with the FBI’s criminal investigation.  If cases of illness are found that do not 
fit epidemiologically with the alleged time, place, or mode of exposure, a full 
epidemiologic investigation should be conducted to determine the actual time and 
conditions of exposure, just as if the event had been covert. (After: California Department 
of Health and Human Services Response Plan). 
 . 
 131
APPENDIX C.  (CDC) TOP PRIORITY BIOTERRORISM THREAT 
AGENTS 
A. CATEGORY A 
High-priority agents include organisms that pose a risk to national security because they: 
• can be easily disseminated or transmitted person-to-person 
• cause high mortality, with potential for major public health impact 
• might cause public panic and social disruption 
• require special action for public health preparedness 
 Category A agents include: 
• Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) 
• Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism) 
• Francisella tularensis (tularemia) 
• variola major (smallpox) 
• Yersinia pestis (plague) 
• Filoviruses 
• Ebola virus (Ebola hemorrhagic fever) 
• Marburg virus (Marburg hemorrhagic fever) 
• Arena viruses 
• Junin virus (Argentinean hemorrhagic fever) and related viruses 
• Lassa virus (Lassa fever) 
 
B. CATEGORY B 
Second highest priority agents include those that: 
• are moderately easy to disseminate 
• cause moderate morbidity and low mortality 
• require specific enhancements of public health diagnostic capacity and 
enhanced disease surveillance 
 Category B agents include: 
• Alpha viruses 
• Eastern and western equine encephalomyelitis viruses (EEE, WEE) 
• Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus (VEE) 
 132
• Brucella species (brucellosis) 
• Burkholderia mallei (glanders) 
• Coxiella burnetii (Q fever) 
• Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens 
• Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis 
• Staphylococcal enterotoxin B 
A subset of Category B agents includes pathogens that are food- or waterborne. 
These pathogens include but are not limited to: 
• Cryptosporidium parvum 
• Escherichia coli O157:H7 
• Salmonella species 
• Shigella dysenteriae 
• Vibrio cholerae 
 
C. CATEGORY C 
Third highest priority agents include emerging pathogens that could be engineered 
for mass dissemination in the future because of: 
• availability 
• ease of production and dissemination 
• potential for high morbidity and mortality and major health impact 
 Category C agents include: 
• Hantaviruses 
• Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis 
• Nipah virus 
• Tick-borne encephalitis viruses 
• Tick-borne hemorrhagic fever viruses 
• Yellow fever 
Preparedness for List C agents requires ongoing research to improve disease 
detection, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention.  (After: California Department of Health 
and Human Services Response Plan). 
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APPENDIX D.  DMIS TOOLS 
A. STARTING DMI-SERVICES 
The DMI-Services Quick Start screen, which displays at the start of every new 
DMIS session, can help expedite the process of starting new incidents, alerts, and Instant 
Message sessions.  
 
 
Figure 32.   DMIS Log In (From DMIS Program)  
 
The ‘Quick Start’ screen may also be used to review an operator's profile.  Locate 
recently used incidents quicker and easier by using the Most Recently Used (MRU) List. 
The MRU List allows the operator open and displays the four most recently used 
Incidents and Alerts.  Those COG Operators who frequently send Incidents and Alerts to 
the same COGs should like the new Distribution Lists feature.  Distribution Lists allow 
an operator to establish a list of COGs to whom new Incidents and Alerts may be sent on 
a regular basis.  In summary DMIs updated release offers:   
Journal produces a clean audit trail -- The delete and update features have been 
removed from Journal function to enable COGs to have a clean audit trail in that 
Operators cannot alter saved journal entries after the fact. 
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Expanded list of Incident Types -- When creating a new incident, Operators 
may now choose from among 28 specific types of incidents. 
Improved Incident List -- DMI-Services has added the Last Update/Post Date 
field to the Incident List for easier sorting. 
COG Sorting -- Operators find each other easier in the DMIS Messenger. They 
can sort COGs in a drop-down list of DMIS Messenger. Now it's easier than ever to find 
specific Operators quickly. 
Web Map Services -- DMI-Services added Iowa's Environmental Mesonet (IEM) 
RadView Service to Web Map Services. This service, also known as NEXRAD, is a 
composite radar service updated every five minutes.   
Once you installed DMIS you should proceed as follows: 
1.  Double-click on the DMI-Services icon.  The Login screen is displayed. 
2.  Enter the assigned operator (User) name in the Operator Login Name 
field. 
3.  Enter the assigned password in the Password field. 
4.  When a DMI-Services Operator is a member of more than one COG, he or 
she may select which COG to log into from a drop-down list. 
5.  Click the OK button or press the Enter key to log into DMIServices. Once 
the operator has logged in, the Login screen closes and the DMIS Desktop 
menu becomes active. 
From the DMI-Services menu the DMI-Services operator may access all 
functionality that the COG Administrator has set for him or her. Permissions are granted 
based on role. 
 
 
Figure 33.   DMI-Services Menu (From: DMIS Program)  
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After the operator has successfully logged into DMIS, the ‘Quick Start’ screen is 
displayed. ‘Quick Start’ enables the operator to quickly create new Incidents and Alerts, 
access and Operator Profile, or start an Instant Messenger session. 
 
Figure 34.   DMI Services Quick Start (From: DMIS Program) 
 
Click on the New Incident button to begin a new incident. 
Click on the New Alert button to create a new Alert. 
Click on the Operator Profile button to display the Operator Profile screen. 
Click on the Instant Message button to start a new DMIS Messenger session. 
Upon logging into DMIS, the DMI-Services Operator can access DMIS functions 
from the DMI-Services menu. 
Commands in the menus have underlined letters that indicate what keys can be 




Figure 35.   DMI Services (From: DMIS Program) 
 
Logout Menu Option --To log out of DMI-Services, the Operator may use the 
Logout command accessible under the DMI-Services menu.  Administration Menu 
Option Operators can use the Administration menu, located in the DMIServices 
menu, to access: 
• Settings 
• COG Profile 
• Operator Profile 
 
 
Figure 36.   DMI Services (From: DMIS Program) 
COG Administrators can use the Administration menu, located in the DMI-
Services menu, to access: 
• Settings 
• COG Configuration 
• COG Profile 




B. DMI CAPABILITIES 
1. Tactical Information Exchange Menu Option 
The Tactical Information Exchange menu, located in the DMIServices menu, 
enables the DMI-Services operator to access commands for: 
• Incident List 
• Archived Incident List 
 
 
Figure 37.   DMI Services (From: DMIS Program) 
 
2. Disaster Management Tools Menu Option 
The Disaster Management Tools menu is located in the DMIServices menu. Here 
the operator can access commands for: 
• Web Based Tools 
• Disaster Help 
• NOAA nowCoast 
• NOAA EMWIN 
• DMI-Services Home 
• National Incident Summary Map 
• DMIS Messenger 
• Weather Forecast Tool 
• Alerts List 
• Distribution List 
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Figure 38.   DMIS Management Tools (From: DMIS Program) 
 
3. Reports Menu Option 
The Reports menu is only available in the Operator Profile, Incident List, and 






Figure 39.   Reports Menu (From: DMIS Program) 
 
4. Using Screen Controls 
A DMI-Services screen is made up of different controls, including text boxes, 
option buttons, drop-down lists, tables, etc. You can use either the mouse or Tab key to 
move from field to field. 
a. Text Boxes 
Text boxes hold a limited amount of data. To enter information in a text 
box, click inside the box and begin typing. Use the Tab key to go from field to field. 
 
 
Figure 40.   Text Boxes (From: DMIS Program) 
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b. Memo Fields 




Figure 41.   Memo Fields (From: DMIS Program) 
 
c. Radio buttons 
Radio buttons are used to select one option from a group of many options. 
Only one choice can be selected at a given time. To select an option, click the radio 




Figure 42.   Radio buttons (From: DMIS Program) 
 
d. Check-boxes 
Check-boxes allow the operator to select more than one choice in a group. 
The operator can select any number of check-boxes (or leave them blank). 
 
 
Figure 43.   Check-boxes (From: DMIS Program) 
 
e. Drop-down Lists 
Drop-down lists enable the operator to select from a pre-set list of entries. 
Drop-down lists offer flexibility that enables the operator to select a previously-used 
entry or, in some cases, to add their own entry. 
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Figure 44.   Drop Down lists (From: DMIS Program) 
 
5. Calendars 
Calendars are available on many screens to help enter dates. 
 
Figure 45.   Calendar (From: DMIS Program) 
 
6. Tree View 
DMI-Services uses a tree structure in many situations. The tree structure displays 
the relationship of several items. For example, in TIE the screens for an Incident are 
represented by a tree structure that makes it easy to move through the screens in any 
order. For example, to open a screen, click on the paper icon beside the name. To open 
the Casualties panel, click on the icon next to the word Casualties.  
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Figure 46.   Tree View (From: DMIS Program) 
 
7. Tactical Information Exchange (TIE) 
TIE is made up of two major parts: Incident Information and Specific Needs 
Requests. The incident Information component allows operators to share information 
about an Incident, including maps, sheltering information, weather, etc. Specific Needs 
Request provides a means of communicating needs for resources (personnel, supplies, 
etc.) and of replying to the requests that are made.  TIE provides broadly accessible 
capabilities for exchange of information within and between emergency management 
organizations. Those already using situation reporting software (such as Computer-Aided 
Management of Emergency Operations -- CAMEO), as well as those using the TIE 
application from DMIServices, are able to rapidly develop and exchange Incident 
Information with other DMI-Services Operators.  Using DMI-Services provides 
Operators with an enhanced ability to present a common operating picture and to improve 
the overall level of situational awareness of incident conditions. DMI-Services include 
tools to expedite information exchange about mutual aid, state and Federal assistance, 
and cascading consequences. 
8. Incident List 
The Incident List screen is used to access incidents for creation, modification, 
posting, archiving, and reporting.  The top pane of the screen is used to filter the list. 
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Dropdown lists are used to specify the filter criteria. For more information about filtering 
the Incident List, see Filtering the Incident List. 
 
 
Figure 47.   Incident List (From: DMIS Program) 
 
The Incident List table in the middle of the screen displays the active Incidents. 
DMI-Services retrieves and displays an updated Incident List when an Operator: 
• Creates a new incident 
• Modifies an incident 
• Posts an incident 
• Archives an incident 
• Filters the Incident List by any criteria 
• Sorts the Incident List by any of the fields 
• Clicks on the Refresh button. 
• Each entry or row in the Incident List displays data in the following fields: 
• Status/Attachments Icon 






• Date, and 
• Description. 
Icon Status Displays the appropriate icon for the status of that specific incident. 
See icons. 
SNR Icon Displays SNR Icon if a Specific Needs Request has been created 
and/or posted. 
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Version Displays the version number for the Incident. 
Number Displays the Incident Number. 
 
 
Figure 48.   Incident List (From: DMIS Program) 
 
9. Weather Tool  
To access the weather tool: 
1.  Retrieve the Incident List and open the Incident Information panel. 
2.  From the Incident Information form, select the Weather Forecasts icon to 
open the panel.  The Weather Forecasts panel is displayed. 
3.  Enter the ZIP Code in and click the Go button.  DMIS refreshes the screen 
to display the forecast for ZIP Code. 
 
 








10. Radar Data 
 
Figure 50.   Radar data (From: DMIS Program) 
 
11. Shelter Place 
 
 









12. Property Damage 
 
 
Figure 52.   Property Damage (DMIS Program) 
 
 





Figure 53.   Infrastructure (From: DMIS Program) 
 
14. Medical Information 
 
 
Figure 54.   Medical Information (From: DMIS Program) 
 





Figure 55.   Archiving Menu (From: DMIS Program) 
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